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I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose . . . we began by asking not what is being prohibited,
but what is being produced. Suppose we looked not to the
negative aspect of the law—the interdiction by which it formally
expresses itself—but at its positive aspect: the real effects that
conformity with the law produces at the level of everyday lives
and social practices.1
Could we ask, about a concept like bisexuality that is gaining
new currency, [not] so much ‘What does it really mean?’ or
‘Who owns it and are they good or bad?’, but ‘What does it
do?’—what . . . does it make easier or harder for people of
various kinds to accomplish and think?2
This Article proposes that same-sex marriage bans channel individuals,
particularly bisexuals, into heterosexual relations and relationships,
impermissibly burdening sexual liberty interests protected under Lawrence
v. Texas.3 A claim from sexual liberty departs dramatically from the
legal paradigms and advocacy strategies that currently dictate the terms
of constitutional debate on this issue. In case after case, plaintiffs who
come in pairs allege that the requirement of “one man and one woman”
infringes their fundamental right to marry and discriminates on the basis
of both sex and sexual orientation. Partners of five, fifteen, even fifty
years protest that their exclusion from marriage is baseless and harmful,
and they demand as couples that the state immediately issue them

1. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 783 (1989).
2. Posting of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick to QSTUDY-L@UBVM.cc.buffalo.edu
(Aug. 17, 1994, 7:49 PM) (emphasis denoted by asterisks in original), quoted in Clare
Hemmings, Bisexual Theoretical Perspectives: Emergent and Contingent Relationships,
in THE BISEXUAL IMAGINARY 14, 16 (Bi Academic Intervention ed., 1997).
3. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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licenses.4 These arguments, despite their legal force and emotional
appeal, ignore and effectively occlude one of the most insidious aspects
of same-sex marriage bans. Existing couples are indeed disadvantaged
and stigmatized by the traditional definition of marriage, but also injured
are individuals with open choices about whether and with whom to
partner. For this latter, larger class of persons, the law’s harm is not its
failure to acknowledge and support an already-flourishing relationship,
but its interference with personal choices about which relationships to
enter in the first place.
The institution of marriage excludes, but it also compels and deters.
Nowhere is this coercion more palpable than from the standpoint of
bisexuality. It is precisely because a bisexual possesses the “meaningful
alternative” denied an exclusive homosexual5—because she can marry
someone of a sex she desires—that her prerogatives are so readily and
understandably manipulated by marriage’s enormous prestige and benefits.
To be sure, the marriage laws’ encroachment onto sexual liberty is
impermissible regardless of sexual orientation. The constitutional right
to choose homosexual relations and relationships is a universal freedom
and inheres whatever one’s desire or disposition to exercise it. But it is
in the lives of bisexuals, whose desires and dispositions are not
categorically limited by sex, that the traditional definition of marriage is
best poised, as Lawrence puts it, to “control their destiny.”6
The bisexual’s claim mobilizes one of the few aspects of Lawrence
neglected in same-sex marriage litigation: its holding.7 Judges call upon
Lawrence for an array of doctrinal and rhetorical purposes, but rarely
and fleetingly do they mention the sexual liberty the decision centrally
4. See Third Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate & Complaint for Declaratory
& Injunctive Relief at 13, Woo v. Lockyer, No. 4365 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 2004),
available at http://www.domawatch.org/cases/california/sanfranciscovstate/Woo_3rd
AmndPet.pdf (noting fifty-one year partnership of Phyllis Lyon and Del Martin);
Verified Complaint at 9, Kerrigan v. State, 909 A.2d 89 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004) (No.
CV04-4001813), 2004 WL 5651244 [hereinafter Kerrigan Complaint] (noting fifteenyear partnership of Jeffrey Busch and Stephen Davis); Amended Complaint to Redress
the Denial of the Basic Civil Right to Marry at 6, Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963
(Wash. 2006) (No. 04-2-04964-4SEA), 2004 WL 5577870 (noting five-year partnership
of Michelle Esguerra and Boo Torres de Esguerra).
5. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub
nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).
6. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
7. By holding, I mean the “incontrovertible” proposition “that Texas’s prohibition
on same-sex sodomy violated the Due Process Clause.” Jamal Greene, Beyond Lawrence:
Metaprivacy and Punishment, 115 YALE L.J. 1862, 1868 (2006).
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protects. Meanwhile, gay rights advocates deploy sexual liberty for
context, not content—to situate plaintiffs’ fundamental right to marry
within a family of protected freedoms, not to supply an independent
ground for redress.8 Yet the freedom to marry is not the only due process
liberty that judges and litigators can invoke in this contest. As several
courts have made clear in Lawrence-based challenges to the military’s
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, autonomy’s “substantial protection
. . . in matters pertaining to sex” forbids less ambitious intrusions than
outright criminal prohibition.9
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II develops the legal argument
that same-sex marriage bans are unconstitutional under Lawrence
because they substantially burden the right to choose homosexual relations
and relationships.10 It draws on Professor Carl Schneider’s influential
taxonomy of the “channelling function in family law” to describe marriage’s
tripartite encroachment onto this right: proscription of competing
institutions, vast material support, and symbolic valorization.11 These
burdens fall differently on different people, punishing those who form
same-sex couples while disciplining single individuals into different-sex
relationships. Though both perspectives furnish grounds for constitutional
objection, the individual’s claim of compulsion more effectively conjures
the anti-“normalizing,” indeed “antitotalitarian,”12 spirit that animates
“the substantive reach of liberty under the Due Process Clause.”13 Part

8. The term gay rights often effects the very bisexual erasure this Article challenges.
It is used here to resuscitate the idea that gay rights are not just for gay people, narrowly
construed as exclusive homosexuals. See infra Part VI; see also Jay P. Paul, Bisexuality:
Reassessing Our Paradigms of Sexuality, in BISEXUALITIES: THEORY AND RESEARCH 21,
26–27 (Fritz Klein & Timothy J. Wolf eds., 1985) (paraphrasing DON CLARK, LOVING
SOMEONE GAY 71–73 (1977)) (“Homosexual is the label that was applied to Gay people
as a device for separating us from the rest of the population . . . . Gay . . . means that we
are capable of fully loving a person of the same gender. . . . But the label does not limit
us. We who are Gay can still love someone of [the] other gender.”).
9. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572; Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 819
(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting this language from Lawrence); Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 52
(1st Cir. 2008) (same).
10. To ground its arguments in a legal idiom that is broadly applicable and
generally familiar, this Article relies primarily on the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution as interpreted in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558. It should be noted,
however, that a number of state constitutions have been held to protect sexual rights
more vigorously than the federal Constitution. See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d
332, 349 (Ark. 2002) (invalidating sodomy law to afford “protection of individual rights
greater than the federal floor”); Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 22 (Ga. 1998) (same);
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 497 (Ky. 1992) (same); Gryczan v. State,
942 P.2d 112, 123 (Mont. 1997) (same).
11. Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 495, 503–12 (1992).
12. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 776, 804.
13. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
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II concludes that the marriage laws’ burden on the homosexual dimension
of sexual liberty is, to put it mildly, substantial.
Part III posits bisexuality, understood as dual-sex desire, as an
illuminating perspective on the coerced heterosexuality of marriage.14
Analyzing bisexual experience in terms of what Adrienne Rich, pointing
first and foremost to marriage, influentially called “compulsory
heterosexuality,”15 it reviews psychological, sociological, and biographical
evidence that marriage is an important factor in many bisexuals’
rejection of homosexual relations and relationships. To the extent such
proof depends on the hindsight of self-identified and often plucky,
politicized bisexuals, it represents the tip of a massive iceberg, deep and
mute.16 Part III concludes by emphasizing the principle of “sexual choice”
that advocates of a distinctively bisexual politics avow in debates over
gay rights.17
Part IV asks why same-sex marriage advocates, far from advancing
any argument specifically grounded in bisexuality, faithfully uphold
what Professor Kenji Yoshino dubbed “an epistemic contract of bisexual
erasure.”18 Bisexuality’s seeming lubrication of the slippery slope to
polygamy is one reason for this erasure, but far more important is
bisexuality’s complication of the fixed and binary conception of sexual
orientation on which several equality arguments for same-sex marriage
currently depend. First, bisexuality disturbs the “conduct-status conflation,”
or the idea that discrimination against homosexual couples is effectively

14. To the extent legal scholarship has addressed marriage’s channeling of bisexuals
into heterosexuality, the problem has been cast in terms of sex equality, not sexual
liberty. See Mary Becker, Women, Morality, and Sexual Orientation, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S
L.J. 165, 174, 212, 213 (1998) (arguing that, in addition to formally discriminating on
the basis of sex, same-sex marriage bans effect a “substantive” discrimination against
women by steering their more “fluid” sexuality “into intimate relationships in which they
are subordinated and exploited”); Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual
Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353, 459 (2000) (speculating that a bisexual might challenge
these bans as sex-based discriminations because they inhibit “seeing ‘through’ sex to
other traits [a bisexual] . . . find[s] more important”).
15. Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5 SIGNS: J.
WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 631, 632 (1980).
16. Most persons with dual-sex attractions do not identify as bisexual. See ANJANI
CHANDRA ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, SEXUAL
ATTRACTION, AND SEXUAL IDENTITY IN THE UNITED STATES: DATA FROM THE 2006–2008
NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 31 (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
data/nhsr/nhsr036.pdf.
17. See infra notes 233–37 and accompanying text.
18. Yoshino, supra note 14, at 460.
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discrimination against homosexual people. Second, bisexuality confounds
the “claim of identity negation,” which holds that same-sex marriage
bans discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation—even though they
make no mention of that characteristic—because a homosexual’s right to
marry heterosexually is no right at all. Third, bisexuality troubles the
“immutability excuse,” or the argument that same-sex marriage bans
warrant heightened judicial scrutiny because sexual orientation is
inalterable. All three arguments implicitly concede that deterrence of
homosexuality is bad because it is useless, not because it is wrong. This
Article urges same-sex marriage advocates to reconsider whether that
concession, and the bisexual erasure it demands, are doctrinally and
strategically necessary.
Part V describes the “politics of containment” lurking behind the
rhetoric of homosexual equality. It shows that opposition to gay rights is
premised, often explicitly, on the belief that liberalization signals moral
approval of homosexuality and thereby emboldens homosexual “lifestyle
choices” among people who would otherwise pursue heterosexuality.
Because same-sex marriage epitomizes such approval, and because
bisexuals epitomize the class of persons whose sexual careers hang in
the balance, gay rights advocates’ need to suppress bisexuality may
seem compelling in this context. As a legal matter, however, moralitybased deterrence of homosexuality has been largely expunged from
constitutional debate on same-sex marriage. With the exception of
arguments about parents’ influence on the sexual and gender development
of children—arguments whose legal refutation actually might be
bolstered by the bisexual’s anti-channeling claim—opponents of gay
rights effectively concede that same-sex marriage bans cannot stand
upon a purely moral preference for heterosexuality.
The Article concludes that a claim from (bi)sexual liberty is worth
raising in same-sex marriage litigation despite the existence of sometimessuccessful alternatives. In addition to the claim’s doctrinal plausibility,
its faithful account of a widespread injustice, and its robust representation of
a neglected gay rights constituency, an argument from bisexuality for
same-sex marriage develops enabling frameworks for sexual politics
beyond Lawrence and beyond same-sex marriage. Where some gay
rights advocates champion marriage as gay people’s abandonment of
“sexual liberty” for “civilized commitment,” their ascension to “full
formal equality,” indeed their incorporation into the “last legal bastion of
compulsory heterosexuality,”19 this Article asks how this civil rights
19. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM
SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 65 (1996) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, THE CASE
FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE]; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY

420

[VOL. 49: 415, 2012]

Sexual Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

imperative can serve less normalizing aspirations and more imaginative
goals.20 By characterizing same-sex marriage bans as coercive as well as
discriminatory, the bisexual’s claim advances a universalizing conception of
homosexuality that may enable detection of subtler heterosexist
compulsions than marriage. And by emphasizing sexual choice over
sexual orientation, it stakes the most prominent gay rights issue of our
time on grounds that “persons in every generation can invoke . . . in their
own search for greater freedom.”21
II. SEXUAL LIBERTY AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
A. A Right To Choose Homosexual Relations and Relationships
In September 1998, officers of the Houston police department were
“dispatched to [the] private residence” of John Geddes Lawrence, whom
they found having anal sex with another man, Tyron Garner.22 Lawrence
and Garner were arrested, convicted, and fined under a Texas law
prohibiting “deviate sexual intercourse” between persons of the same
sex.23 Relying on Bowers v. Hardwick,24 the Texas Court of Appeals
upheld their convictions.25 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari
on three questions: (1) whether Texas’s “Homosexual Conduct” law
violated equal protection by proscribing “sexual intimacy by same-sex
couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex couples”; (2) whether it
violated “vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due
MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE?: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE 12
(2006).
20. A number of legal scholars have advocated for same-sex marriage on grounds
other than formal equality. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse
on Same-Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1871 (1997);
Chai R. Feldblum, Gay Is Good: The Moral Case for Marriage Equality and More, 17
YALE J.L. & F EMINISM 139 (2005); Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender:
A Feminist Inquiry, 1 L. & SEXUALITY 9 (1991); Robin West, Universalism, Liberal
Theory, and the Problem of Gay Marriage, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 705 (1998).
21. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003).
22. Id. at 562–63. The facts of the Lawrence case are far more complicated and
contested than those related by the Supreme Court. Indeed, Lawrence and Garner may
not have been engaging in sexual activity at all when the police appeared. See DALE
CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 61–74 (2012).
23. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563.
24. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (upholding Georgia’s sodomy
statute on the ground that the Constitution does not guarantee “a fundamental right to
engage in homosexual sodomy”), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
25. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563.
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”; and (3) “[w]hether
Bowers . . . should be overruled.”26 The Lawrence majority focused on
the latter two questions and answered both affirmatively. Adopting
Justice Stevens’s dissenting analysis in Bowers, the Court declined to
distinguish between the sexual liberty of married and unmarried persons
and rejected majoritarian morality as a “sufficient reason” for prohibiting a
sexual practice.27 “The Texas statute,” it concluded, “furthers no legitimate
state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private
life of the individual.”28
“Liberty,” Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court, “presumes an
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression,
and certain intimate conduct.”29 His opinion traces along two main
tracks the development of the particular liberty “at stake” in Lawrence30:
state-level legislative and constitutional history, which attested before
and after Bowers to “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial
protection” to decisions about “matters pertaining to sex”;31 and forty
years of precedent expanding the “substantive reach of liberty under the
Due Process Clause.”32 The decision characterizes Bowers as an aberration
from Griswold v. Connecticut,33 Eisenstadt v. Baird,34 Roe v. Wade,35
Carey v. Population Services International,36 and especially Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,37 which affirmed
eight years after Bowers that a range of “personal decisions” enjoys
constitutional protection.38 Justice Kennedy’s most succinct statement
of Lawrence’s holding is immediately supported with a line from Casey:
“The[] right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives [Petitioners]
the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the

26. Id. at 564.
27. Id. at 577–78 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
28. Id. at 578.
29. Id. at 562.
30. Id. at 567.
31. Id. at 568–73.
32. Id. at 564–68, 573–74.
33. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating ban on assisted contraception by married
couples).
34. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending Griswold on equal protection grounds to unmarried
couples).
35. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating ban on abortion), overruled in part by
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
36. 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating ban on provision of contraception to persons
under sixteen).
37. 505 U.S. 833 (affirming that the right to choose abortion is constitutionally
protected).
38. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564–66, 573–74 (2003).
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government. ‘It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of
personal liberty which the government may not enter.’”39
Justice O’Connor, who voted with the majority in Bowers, would have
invalidated Texas’s Homosexual Conduct Law not for violating the
freedom to engage in, quite precisely, homosexual conduct, but for
invidious discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause: “While it is
true that the law applies only to conduct, the conduct . . . is closely
correlated with being homosexual. Under such circumstances, Texas’
sodomy law is targeted at . . . gay persons as a class.”40 At the time no
Justices joined Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, but her analysis was
quietly affirmed in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez.41 Faced with a
religious organization’s claim that its membership policy excluded only
practicing, unrepentant homosexuals, Justice Ginsburg answered: “Our
decisions have declined to distinguish between status and conduct in this
context.”42 As Justice Kennedy had written in Lawrence, “[e]quality of
treatment and . . . the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important
respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests.”43
Lawrence’s recognition that liberty and equality are often related is a
vital development for gay rights specifically and for constitutional law
generally.44 It is not, however, an invitation to collapse one value into
the other, as if personal freedom were a mere instrumentality of social
parity. However “tenable” the Court found Lawrence and Garner’s
equal protection claim,45 it was sexual liberty, not homosexual equality,
that the majority unequivocally vindicated: “Were we to hold the statute
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might question whether
a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the

39. Id. at 578 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 847).
40. Id. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
41. See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
42. Id. at 2990 (“When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the
State, that declaration . . . is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination.”
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575)).
43. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
44. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental
Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004) (describing
Lawrence’s significance to both the gay rights movement and the Supreme Court’s
substantive due process jurisprudence); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124
HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011) (examining the Court’s intertwined conceptions of equality
and liberty).
45. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
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conduct both between same-sex and different-sex participants.”46 In
light of this clear statement, it is initially perplexing that Professor
Pamela Karlan, to take one example, should insist that Lawrence is
fundamentally about equality.47 Reading “class-based animosity” toward
“gay people” where Justice Kennedy identified moral “[c]ondemnation
of [homosexual] practices,” Professor Karlan says that the Court’s
rejection of this purpose, “whatever the Court’s doctrinal handle, sounds
in equal protection.”48 Underlying this conclusion is the unverifiable
contention that, though sodomy laws deprived “gay people . . . equal respect
for their life choices,” they staged no real “interference” with whether
and how those choices were reached.49 Noting that Texas’s sodomy
prohibition was “virtually never enforced,” Karlan finds it “hard to imagine
that the law had any activity-level effects on nonpublic, consensual
behavior at all.”50 Thus Lawrence was “different from . . . the Court’s
previous autonomy cases,” and was really about treating like things
alike—specifically, the respective “love lives” of gay and straight people.51
The Court, however, saw the question presented in Lawrence more
broadly, and prominently ranked the Texas statute’s ostensible purpose
of discouraging homosexual relations and relationships among its
practical effects: “The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private
lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny
by making their private sexual conduct a crime.”52 Lawrence clearly
rejects both of these intentions, but control over one’s destiny is the
principle proclaimed at the decision’s philosophical core. Quoting the
opinion he co-authored in Casey, Justice Kennedy wrote:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could

46. Id. at 575.
47. See Pamela S. Karlan, Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447 (2004); see
also Greene, supra note 7, at 1867 (identifying Lawrence’s “rationale” as “the
proposition that conduct agreed by social consensus to be ‘status-definitional’ cannot be
punished for morality’s sake”); cf. Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 1103, 1104, 1123 (2004) (characterizing equality as a “minor chord” rounding out
Lawrence’s “major chord” of liberty).
48. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571; Karlan, supra note 47, at 1450–51.
49. Karlan, supra note 47, at 1450, 1452.
50. Id. at 1452–53.
51. Id.
52. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (emphasis added).
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not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of
the State.53

Read out of context, these lines might evoke religious liberties
protected by the First Amendment, not sexual liberties protected by the
Fourteenth. Indeed their emphasis on the metaphysical stakes of certain
intimate decisions suggests a new kind of “disestablishment”54—a
transfer into the domain of individual discretion certain moral questions
on which religion, despite successive consolidations of political secularism,
remained uniquely authoritative for public policy.55 Lawrence’s “sweetmystery-of-life passage,” as Justice Scalia derisively called it,56 makes a
good deal more sense when one considers the Court’s acknowledgment
that age-old condemnations of “homosexual conduct as immoral”
continue to this day to control the destiny of countless individuals: “For
many persons these are not trivial concerns but . . . ethical and moral
principles to which they aspire and which thus determine the course of
their lives.”57
Thus Lawrence’s ultimate concern is not with what people are or even
what they do, but with the exercise of conscience that mediates between
an actor and her acts. Like the Casey opinion on which it extensively
draws, Lawrence safeguards a “right to choose”58—specifically, a right

53. Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992)).
54. Clifford J. Rosky, Perry v. Schwarzenegger and the Future of Same-Sex Marriage
Law, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 913, 970 (2011).
55. Anglo-American legal discourse long characterized sodomy as “a very horrible
vice which should not be named,” KENNETH BORRIS, SAME-SEX DESIRE IN THE ENGLISH
RENAISSANCE: A SOURCEBOOK OF TEXTS, 1470–1650, at 385 n.67 (2004) (citing V THE
PARLIAMENT ROLLS OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 1275–1504: EDWARD III 1351–1377, at 318
(Mark Ormrod ed., 2005) (1376)), “a detestable, and abominable sin, amongst Christians
not to be named,” EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
E NGLAND 58 (William S. Hein Co. 1986) (1644), “peccatum illud horribile inter
Christianos non nominandum,” IV WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 215 (Duyckinck, Long, Collins & Co. 1822) (1769), “that most horrid and
detestable crime (among Christians not to be named),” Davis v. State, 3 H. & J. 154, 154
(Md. 1810), “sexual behavior . . . as should not be described among Christians,”
Berryman v. State, 283 P.2d 558, 563 (Okla. Crim. App. 1955), and “a detestable, and
abominable sin, amongst Christians not to be named,” Ex parte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 34
(Ala. 2002) (quoting COKE, supra, at 58).
56. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 571 (majority opinion).
58. Id. at 558, 567 (“The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual
persons the right to make this choice.”); see also Sonia K. Katyal, Sexuality and
Sovereignty: The Global Limits and Possibilities of Lawrence, 14 WM. & MARY BILL
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to choose homosexual relations and relationships. How far beyond the
criminal context this right extends is another question and is taken up in
the following subpart. For now it suffices to affirm that, in Justice
Kennedy’s telling expression, “practices common to a homosexual lifestyle”
are squarely “within the liberty of persons to choose.”59
B. Marriage’s Burden on the Right
Rhetorically, doctrinally, and philosophically, Lawrence takes after
Casey. Analytically, however, the decisions are very different. Where
Casey applies an explicit standard—the “undue burden” test—to alleged
violations of the right to choose abortion,60 Lawrence offers no such
guidance with regard to sexual liberty in general or the “full right” to
choose homosexual relations and relationships in particular.61 On the
bench and in the academy, Lawrence’s interpreters have inferred nearly
every conceivable approach: strict scrutiny;62 intermediate scrutiny;63
rational basis review;64 “rational basis with bite;”65 and unstructured
balancing of the interests served and liberties infringed by a given law.66
This Article neither endorses nor applies any of these tests. Whatever
analysis might govern a Lawrence-based claim for same-sex marriage, a
court first must be persuaded that there is some meaningful infringement
to analyze.67 Thus the remainder of this Part describes the nature and

RTS. J. 1429, 1472–78 (2006) (discussing Lawrence’s reliance on Casey’s conception of
“decisional autonomy”).
59. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578, 567.
60. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
61. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
62. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d
1275, 1313 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (demanding “a compelling and
narrowly tailored justification” for a law prohibiting adoption by homosexuals).
63. See, e.g., Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 821–22 (9th Cir. 2008)
(applying “an intermediate level of scrutiny” to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”).
64. See, e.g., Seegmiller v. Laverkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 771 (10th Cir. 2008)
(applying rational basis review to punishment of a police officer for off-duty sexual
conduct).
65. See Claudio J. Pavia, Constitutional Protection of “Sexting” in the Wake
of Lawrence: The Rights of Parents and Privacy, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 189, 202 (2011)
(applying “Lawrence’s seeming rational basis with bite” to regulations of teenage
sexuality); see also Witt, 527 F.3d at 818 (contemplating but rejecting the possibility that
Lawrence applied a “heightened level of scrutiny” other than strict or intermediate).
66. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 745 (5th Cir. 2008).
67. Though the marriage laws do not directly interfere with the right under
Lawrence to choose homosexual relations and relationships, Supreme Court precedent
under several doctrines, including substantive due process, generally “recognize[s] that
an incidental burden on a primary conduct right triggers some form of heightened
scrutiny.” Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1175, 1232–33 (1996).
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magnitude of same-sex marriage bans’ burden on the right to choose
homosexual relations and relationships.68
A threshold inquiry is whether Lawrence specifically insulates itself
from the same-sex marriage controversy. Tempering some evocative
language about the vital role of homosexual sex in the formation and
perpetuation of “enduring” homosexual relationships,69 the Lawrence
Court pointedly insisted that it was ruling on a sodomy law, not a samesex marriage ban. The Texas statute sought to control a “personal
relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the
law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as
68. It is immaterial that this infringement takes the form of selective
subsidization—support for heterosexual but not homosexual couples—rather than
outright prohibition. The benefit-burden distinction, always “tendentious and questionbegging,” is particularly inapt here. See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET,
REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 74–75 (1996); see also
Julie Nice, How Equality Constitutes Liberty: The Alignment of CLS v. Martinez, 38
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 631, 648–54 (2011) (describing the Supreme Court’s
“inconsisten[t]” choice, in cases of selective subsidization, between the principle that
“the government may not do indirectly (through conditions on benefits) what it may not
do directly (through compulsion)” and the principle that “the greater power includes the
lesser [power]”). Cases involving government funding of abortions offer the most
doctrinally relevant points of comparison. Since 1977, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy imposes no duty on the
state to fund or otherwise facilitate abortions, even as it funds other medical decisions
and family planning services. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 173, 203 (1991)
(upholding federal regulation withholding federal funding from programs that, inter alia,
provide counseling about or “referrals for . . . abortion as a method of family planning”);
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989) (upholding state prohibition
on use of public employees and facilities to perform or assist elective abortions); Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (upholding statutory withholding of federal funding
for medically necessary abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (holding
that state limitation of Medicaid funding to medically necessary abortions did not
“impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe”). Every one of these cases was
based on the crucial premise that the state had a constitutionally legitimate preference for
the activity it chose to subsidize—carrying a pregnancy to term. See Maher, 432 U.S. at
475–76 (“There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected
activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative
policy.”); Rust, 500 U.S. at 193 (same); Harris, 448 U.S. at 315 (same); see also
Webster, 492 U.S. at 511 (“[T]he Constitution does not forbid a State or city, pursuant to
democratic processes, from expressing a preference for normal childbirth . . . .” (quoting
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977))). The legitimacy of this “value judgment”
was inscribed in “Roe [v. Wade] itself.” Maher, 432 U.S. at 474, 478. By contrast, the
selective subsidization at issue here—the state’s preference for heterosexual over homosexual
relationships—admits no such a priori justification. To the contrary, Lawrence made
clear that a “value judgment” favoring heterosexual over homosexual relationships is an
unconstitutional ground of legislation. See infra Part V.
69. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
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criminals.”70 The Court emphasized this distinction near the end of its
opinion, noting that “[t]he present case . . . does not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter.”71 Whether these caveats were meant
to prejudice or cautiously leave open the question of same-sex marriage
appears to hinge on what one makes of the Court’s admonition against
“attempts by the State . . . to define the meaning of [a] relationship or to
set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the
law protects.”72 Assuming marriage to be the “institution” at issue here,73
there are at least two reasons why same-sex marriage is not among the
“abuse[s]” the Court fears. First, the opinion’s juxtaposition of “injury
to a person” and “abuse of an institution” suggests concern about practices
widely understood to encompass both harms: adultery or polygamy,
perhaps.74 Second, although some people do consider same-sex marriage
harmful—to its participants, to society, to marriage itself—attributing
this sentiment to the Lawrence majority seems ungenerous.75 It would
be incongruously and gratuitously insulting, a sharp aftertaste of Bowers,76
for an opinion that is otherwise so respectful of “homosexual persons,” so
concerned for their “dignity,”77 to call same-sex marriage an “abuse” of
the marital institution.
Ultimately one can only speculate as to the Lawrence Court’s immediate
intentions with respect to same-sex marriage. What is clear is that from
the day Lawrence was decided, commentators of various political stripes
have doubted the existence of a constitutionally meaningful obstacle to
extending the case to this issue.78 Justice Scalia’s dissent offered the
first and still the most memorable expression of this view. In direct
response to the Court’s “bald, unreasoned disclaimer,” he stated simply:
“Do not believe it. . . . This case ‘does not involve’ the issue of homosexual
marriage only if one entertains the belief that principle and logic have
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 578.
72. Id. at 567.
73. Karlan, supra note 47, at 1459.
74. For an early suggestion to this effect, see Mary Anne Case, Of “This” and
“That” in Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 75, 140–41 (2004).
75. See Tribe, supra note 44, at 1950 (calling it “implausible,” in light of other
rhetoric in Lawrence, that this language refers to same-sex marriage).
76. See EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 6 (1990) (describing
Bowers’s “unusual power to offend”).
77. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 560, 567, 572, 575, 577.
78. See, e.g., Sarah Kershaw, Adversaries on Gay Rights Vow State-by-State Fight,
N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2003, at 8 (quoting Freedom to Marry director Evan Wolfson’s
prediction that Lawrence provides “a tremendous tool” for winning same-sex marriage);
The Threat to Marriage from the Courts, U.S. SENATE REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMMITTEE
(July 29, 2003), http://rpc.senate.gov/releases/2003/jd072903.pdf.
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nothing to do with the decisions of this Court.”79 Justice Scalia’s fears
have proved warranted. Judges who favor same-sex marriage do not feel
constrained by Lawrence’s questionable caveats. Citing Lawrence, they
discount “moral disapprobation” of homosexuality80 as a constitutionally
permissible rationale for denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples.81
Citing Lawrence, they equate homosexual conduct with homosexual
status, and go on to analyze same-sex marriage bans as infringements of
equal protection.82 Citing Lawrence, they consider “history and tradition”
as informative, not determinative, of plaintiffs’ substantive due process
claim of a fundamental right to marry.83 And citing Lawrence, they
repudiate Bowers v. Hardwick’s error of framing contested rights so
narrowly as to render them unprecedented.84
1. Discipline or Punishment?
One aspect of Lawrence that receives scant attention in same-sex
marriage litigation is the sexual liberty the decision fundamentally ensures.
At most, advocates invoke this liberty to situate couples’ asserted “right
to marry” within a constellation of constitutional freedoms related to
family and reproduction, not to supply an independent ground for
relief.85 One reason for this omission may be the fact that, as couples,
79. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 604.
81. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1002 (N.D. Cal.
2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012); Gill v. Office of
Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 389–90 (D. Mass. 2010); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub.
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 479 (Conn. 2008); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d
941, 948 (Mass. 2003); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 26 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J.,
dissenting).
82. See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 997; In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 440–43
(Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment, CALIF. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5 (West,
Westlaw through Nov. 2008 amendments); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 431 n.24; Varnum v.
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885 (Iowa 2009); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 598, 605–
06 (Md. 2007).
83. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 421; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 466; Deane,
932 A.2d at 696 (Bell, C.J., dissenting); Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 33 (Kaye, C.J.,
dissenting).
84. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 421; Deane, 932 A.2d at 696 (Bell, C.J.,
dissenting); Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 23 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting); Andersen v. King
Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 1028 (Wash. 2006) (Bridge, J., dissenting).
85. See, e.g., Respondent’s Brief at 38–39, In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d
675 (Ct. App. 2005) (No. A110449), 2005 WL 3967315 [hereinafter Marriage Cases
Respondent’s Brief]; Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 32–33, Conaway v. Deane, 932
A.2d 571 (Md. 2007) (No. 44) [hereinafter Deane Appellees’ Brief]. These invocations
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plaintiffs in these cases proclaim—indeed “flaunt”—their exercise of the
right to choose homosexual relations and relationships.86 In Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, however, gay rights advocates overcame this imaginative
hurdle and urged the Ninth Circuit to analyze Proposition 8, California’s
constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage, as a burden on
sexual liberty, which the court had done two years earlier in a case
holding “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” unconstitutional under Lawrence.87 The
Perry amici argued that, like the military’s employment policy, the
marriage ban “disadvantages those who are in same-sex relationships
because they are in same-sex relationships. . . . Indeed, Proposition 8
strikes closer to the . . . right identified in Lawrence,” placing “a
disadvantage on the relationship itself.”88
As the Perry brief illustrates, one way to raise a Lawrence-based
marriage claim is to characterize the harm wrought by same-sex marriage
bans as punitive and to show how same-sex couples are “disadvantage[d]”
for their exercise of a constitutionally protected liberty. But there is
another way, one that comes closer to the anti-“normalizing“ spirit of
Lawrence, Casey, and their antecedents.89 Focusing on individuals rather
than couples, advocates can characterize the challenged laws as disciplinary,
coercive, deterrent.90 Of course the two arguments are of a piece;
punishment and deterrence often work together.91

resonate with the “domesticated liberty” that Lawrence’s rhetoric idealizes, though its
holding clearly encompassed the casual sexual relations for which petitioners in that case
had been convicted. See Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v.
Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1414 (2004); Dale Carpenter, The Unknown Past of
Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1464, 1523 (2004).
86. Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on
the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643, 1658
(1993).
87. Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU Foundation of Northern California et al. in
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 21–28, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147 (9th
Cir. 2010) (No. 10-16696) [hereinafter Perry LGBT Advocates’ Brief] (citing Witt v.
Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008)).
88. Perry LGBT Advocates’ Brief, supra note 87, at 22, 25 (emphasis added).
89. See Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 800–01.
90. Alleging a “burden” on “the fundamental right to enter into an intimate
relationship,” complaints filed in Maryland and Oregon hinted at the deterrent aspect of
same-sex marriage bans, but in neither case did subsequent filings elaborate this claim.
See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 36–37, Deane v. Conaway, No. 24C-04-005390, 2006 WL 148145 (Md. Cir. Jan. 20, 2006) (No. 10-840), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/deane%20polyak%20complaint.pdf; First Amended
Complaint at 27, Li v. State, No. 0403-03057, 2004 WL 1258167 (Or. Cir. Apr. 20,
2004) [hereinafter Li Complaint].
91. See Kathleen Callahan, In Limbo: In re Davis and the Future of Herrera
Innocence Claims in Federal Habeas Proceedings, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 629, 640 (2011)
(noting “the twin purposes of retribution and deterrence” in the context of capital
punishment).

430

[VOL. 49: 415, 2012]

Sexual Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

The Arkansas Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Department of
Human Services v. Cole offers a useful analogy for the dual nature of the
burden that same-sex marriage bans impose on sexual liberty.92 At issue
in Cole was a law prohibiting adoption and foster care by sexually
intimate, unmarried cohabitants.93 Relying on its prior decision invalidating
a statute much like Texas’s Homosexual Conduct Law, the court
analyzed and ultimately struck down the ban as a burden on the liberty
“to engage in private, consensual, noncommercial, sexual conduct.”94
The Arkansas court compared Cole to Sherbert v. Verner, where the
U.S. Supreme Court accepted a Sabbatarian’s claim that the Free
Exercise Clause did not permit the State of Alabama to condition her
unemployment benefits on willingness to work on Saturdays.95 The
Sherbert Court held that Alabama could not “pressure” an individual to
“choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting
benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her
religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.”96 Likewise the
Arkansas Supreme Court denied that the state could force Cole to “choose
between exercising her fundamental right to engage in an intimate sexual
relationship in the privacy of her home” and “being eligible to adopt or
foster children.”97 It specifically contemplated the possibility that some
citizens will respond to the ban by electing to “lead a life of private,
sexual intimacy with a partner without the opportunity to adopt or foster
children” (punishment) while others will “forego sexual cohabitation
and, thereby, attain eligibility to adopt or foster” (deterrence).98
Essentially the same dynamics are at play in the same-sex marriage
context. Same-sex couples, already enjoying their liberty “to engage in
an intimate sexual relationship” with someone of the same sex, are
forced to live “without the opportunity” to marry.99 The law penalizes them
through deprivation and stigmatization. Meanwhile, single individuals
are instructed to “attain eligibility” to marry by “forego[ing]” exercise of

92. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145 (2011), available at http://
opinions.aoc.arkansas.gov/WebLink8/ElectronicFile.aspx?docid=60137&&dbid=0.
93. See id. at 2–3.
94. Id. at 9.
95. Id. at 12 (discussing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408–09 (1963)).
96. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
97. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145, at 13–14.
98. Id. at 11.
99. See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
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their right to choose a homosexual relationship.100 The law coerces them
by threat of deprivation and stigmatization, functioning similarly to, and
perhaps more effectively than, outright prohibitions of homosexual
conduct.101
The marriage laws’ simultaneously coercive and punitive aspects may
be complementary, but they are not for that reason equivalent. The
constitutional significance of the distinction between conformity and
dissent, adherence to the legal norm and disrespect of it, discipline and
punishment, is nowhere more salient than in the jurisprudence of
substantive due process. As Professor Jed Rubenfeld argued in a critique
aimed largely at Bowers, the “distinctive and singular characteristic” of
laws invalidated under this doctrine is “their productive or affirmative”
power, “their profound capacity to direct” the fate of individuals who
accede to the state’s preferences.102 These laws are harmful, to the point
of being totalitarian, because they steer a life’s “development along a
particular avenue.”103 Prohibitions of homosexual sex, for example,
“channel certain individuals—supposing the law is obeyed—into a
network of social institutions and relations that will occupy their lives
. . . . The proscription is against homosexual sex; the products are lives
forced into relations with the opposite sex.”104 So too with same-sex
marriage bans, whose victims include not only longtime couples penalized
for their homosexual choices but also individuals goaded into heterosexual
relationships—heterosexual marriages, certainly, but also the nonmarital,
premarital, and quasi-marital relations that so many people pursue in
search of a spouse.
2. The Burden’s Substance and Magnitude
Same-sex marriage advocates could argue, though they have not done
so, that same-sex marriage bans are unconstitutional simply because they
compel individuals to choose between two constitutional rights: the
sexual liberty protected in Lawrence and the freedom to marry recognized
in Loving v. Virginia and other cases.105 In McDaniel v. Paty, for

100. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
101. The distinction between individuals and couples should not be overstated. An
individual in a same-sex couple, for example, may still be influenced by same-sex bans
to exit her present relationship in order to pursue a possible spouse.
102. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 739, 784.
103. Id. at 784.
104. Id. at 799–800.
105. I thank Christy Mallory for drawing my attention to this missing argument.
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating ban on interracial marriage);
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 99 (1987) (invalidating prison policy prohibiting inmates
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example, the Supreme Court unanimously struck down a Tennessee law
prohibiting clergy from running for state office.106 Of the eight Justices
who participated in that case, seven agreed that the statute was invalid
because it conditioned a right of political participation on renunciation of
a specific form of religious exercise.107 Though Paty seems readily
applicable to the tension between same-sex marriage bans and the right
to choose homosexual relations and relationships, the remainder of this
subpart shows that these bans’ burden on sexual liberty is unconstitutional
regardless of whether the right to marry is truly fundamental or is
fundamental only as to heterosexual unions.
The law forcefully directs people to marry.108 States avow their policy
to “favor” and “encourage” marriage, and they pursue that purpose in a
bewildering array of contexts.109 The fact of this favoritism is one of the
few points on which both sides of the same-sex marriage debate agree.
One side decries same-sex couples’ exclusion from the numerous rights
and benefits of civil marriage, and from the social legitimacy and selfsatisfaction that marital status affords.110 The other side insists that these
same blandishments are necessary to preserve the traditional family, and
particularly to convey to heterosexually active individuals that marriage
is the proper setting in which to bear and raise children.111
Marriage is the signal instance of what Professor Carl Schneider
influentially called the “channeling function” in family law, or the multiple
and varied ways by which government “recruits, builds, shapes, sustains,

from marrying); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388–91 (1978) (invalidating ban on
marriages by men with outstanding child support obligations).
106. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629 (1978).
107. See id. at 626; id. at 641 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 642–43 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
108. See Ruthann Robson, Compulsory Matrimony, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL
THEORY: INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS, UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS 313, 314 (Martha
Albertson Fineman et al. eds., 2009) (describing “forces that impose, manage, organize,
propagandize and forcefully maintain the political institution of marriage”).
109. See Kathryn Zwicker, Statutory and Judicial Statements of Public Policy
Favoring or Encouraging Marriage in the Fifty States (July 25, 2011) (on file with
author).
110. See, e.g., Robson, supra note 108, at 314.
111. For a discussion of the increasingly prominent argument that marriage
accommodates heterosexuals’ “accidental procreation,” and therefore must remain
heterosexual, see Kerry Abrams & Peter Brooks, Marriage as a Message: Same-Sex
Couples and the Rhetoric of Accidental Procreation, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 2–3
(2009).
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and promotes social institutions.”112 Rarely does the state undertake this
function through outright compulsion.113 Rather, institutions’ “very
presence, the social currency they have, and the governmental support
they receive . . . combine to make it seem reasonable and even natural
for people to use them.”114
The law’s channeling function operates primarily through three
modes, all of which Professor Schneider illustrated by reference to
marriage: prohibition or discouragement of alternatives, material reward,
and symbolic valorization.115 The first of these modes effectively posits
as a given what the present Article sets out to prove—that disfavoring
“competing” social institutions steers people into the one on offer.116
Though Schneider made no mention of same-sex marriage bans, he
emphasized that “criminal sanctions”—against practices like “sodomy,
bigamy, adultery . . . prostitution . . . fornication and cohabitation”—usually
are not the state’s most effective means of steering individuals into the
“normative” ideal of “monogamous, heterosexual, and permanent”
marriage.117 Civil proscriptions can be deployed to the same end, albeit
through less patently coercive means.118
Most laws relevant to marriage are not proscriptive at all. Rather they
offer material support119—myriad incentives, “particularly with respect
to taxation, state employee benefits, and dissolution.”120 As the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts wrote, “[t]he benefits accessible only by
way of a marriage license are enormous, touching nearly every aspect of
life and death.”121 It is instructive simply to count the ways: 1,138
statutory provisions in “the United States Code in which marital status is
a factor in determining or receiving benefits, rights, and privileges”;122
“over 500” in Oregon;123 425 in Maryland;124 and “hundreds” in
Massachusetts,125 only some of them listed in the margin below.126
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Schneider, supra note 11, at 496.
Id. at 503–04.
Id. at 498.
Id. at 503.
Id.
Id. at 520, 503, 500–01.
Id. at 503–04.
Id. at 503.
M.V. Lee Badgett, The Economic Value of Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, 58
DRAKE L. REV. 1081, 1082–83 (2010).
121. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003).
122. See Badgett, supra note 120, at 1082 (quoting Letter from Dayna K. Shah,
Assoc. Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, to Bill Frist, Majority Leader, U.S.
Senate (Jan. 23, 2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf).
123. Li Complaint, supra note 90, at 4.
124. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 646 (Md. 2007) (Raker, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
125. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955.
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“What is all this,” asked the English jurist James Fitzjames Stephen in
1874, “except the expression of the strongest possible determination on
the part of the Legislature to recognize, maintain, and favour marriage in
every possible manner as the foundation of civilized society?”127 The
question is no less apt today.
Adding “competing institutions”128 designed specifically for same-sex
couples, like civil union or domestic partnership,129 or extending equal
support to all families regardless of marital status,130 would mitigate but
could not eliminate the marriage laws’ burden on sexual choice. Such
innovations lack, among other things, marriage’s social currency and
prestige, attributes that for centuries the state has worked purposefully to
cultivate.131 California’s expensive, bitter fight over Proposition 8
126. Professor Janet Halley lists the “legal attributes of marriage” discussed
in Goodridge:
Joint filing of state income tax; tenancy by the entirety; spouses’ and children’s
homestead claim; rights to inherit from an intestate spouse; rights to the
elective share . . . ; entitlement to wages owed to a deceased employee spouse;
. . . right to share [a] medical policy . . . ; thirty-nine week continuation of
health care coverage for the spouse of an insured who is laid off or dies;
preferential options under the state pension system; preferential benefits in the
state’s medical insurance program . . . ; spousal benefits and preferences in
veterans’ benefits programs; financial protections for spouses of certain state
employees . . . killed in the performance of duty; . . . equitable division of property
upon divorce; . . . standing to claim for wrongful death[,] loss of consortium,
. . . funeral and burial expenses and punitive damages in tort actions . . . ;
presumption of legitimacy and parentage of children born to the wife; testimonial
privileges . . . ; qualification for bereavement or medical leave to care for
individuals related by . . . marriage; automatic “family member” preference to
make medical decisions for an incompetent or disabled spouse . . . ; application
of the rules of child custody, visitation, support and removal out-of-state as
part of divorce proceedings; priority rights to be the administrator of the estate
of a . . . spouse who dies intestate . . . ; right to burial in the lot or tomb owned
by the deceased spouse.
Janet E. Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage (I): From Status/Contract to the Marriage
System, 6 UNBOUND 1, 49–50 (2010) (original punctuation and capitalization altered)
(citing Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955–56).
127. JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY (1874), reprinted
in LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY AND THREE BRIEF ESSAYS 23, 156 (Univ. of Chi.
Press 1991).
128. Schneider, supra note 11, at 503.
129. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-29 (West 2010) (establishing civil union);
OR. REV. STAT. § 106.305 (2009) (establishing domestic partnership).
130. For a powerful statement of this imperative, see NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND
(STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008).
131. See Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE
L.J. 1236, 1257–58 (2010) (“[T]he state has encouraged the view that public recognition

435

showed the extent to which governmental recognition of a relationship
as “marriage,” its mere use of the word to describe some and not other
unions, is a coveted mark of social distinction.132 The Supreme Court
itself has described the marital bond as “sacred,”133 ennobling,134 the
“most important relation in life, . . . having more to do with the morals
and civilization of a people than any other institution.”135
Such official endorsements articulate some of the ideology government
mobilizes through the channeling function. Marriage in our society is a
pattern of human relationship thoroughly identified with government—
hence the metaphor “making it legal”—yet whose replication may or
may not depend on the state, drawing as it does on other sources, forces,
and needs. That marriage is an institution upheld in the depth of people’s
souls no less than in statute books is an aggravating, not mitigating,
factor in assessing the marriage laws’ burden on the right to choose
homosexual relationships.136 The marriage to which so many individuals
aspire, the institution that more or less shapes their sexual careers, is a
thoroughly hybrid animal.137 In measuring this creature’s incursion onto
the right to choose homosexual relationships, it is futile—and for the
state disingenuous—to try to separate its legal and nonlegal limbs. As
Karl Llewellyn perfectly put it in 1932, “once [the] law has intervened in
marriage . . . [it] gathers to itself much of [its] ideological power.”138

as a family is something to be prized . . . [and] that individuals should place tremendous
value on their public recognition as husbands [or] wives.”).
132. This lexical privilege was understood by both supporters and opponents of
same-sex marriage in California to be the linchpin of the fundamental, constitutional
right to marry. See Respondents’ Supplemental Brief at 18–29, In re Marriage Cases,
183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (No. S147999); Answer Brief of Campaign for California
Families on the Merits at 7–12, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (No. S147999). For
a rich discussion of the cultural significance of the legal designation “marriage,” see
Marc R. Poirier, Name Calling: Identifying Stigma in the “Civil Union”/“Marriage”
Distinction, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1425 (2009). See also Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052,
1078–79 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The incidents of marriage, standing alone, do not . . . convey
the same governmental and societal recognition as does the designation of ‘marriage’
itself[,] . . . the principal manner in which the State attaches respect and dignity to the
highest form of a committed relationship and to the individuals who have entered into
it.”).
133. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (quoting Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
134. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486; Murphy v. Ramsey, 114
U.S. 15, 45 (1885).
135. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
136. In regulating marriage at all, the state “operate[s] on drives and desires too
strong or too subtle for most to resist.” Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 784.
137. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce (pt. 1), 32 COLUM. L. REV.
1281, 1282 (1932) (“‘The law’ of marriage is hard to isolate, a deal harder than ‘the law’
of most other matters.”).
138. Id. at 1302.
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Notably, gay rights opponents are the first to acknowledge marriage’s
capacity to channel people into heterosexuality—not to mention
monogamy, or indeed sexual relationships tout court.139 Maggie Gallagher
attests: “By socially defining and supporting a particular kind of sexual
union between men and women,” the law of marriage “defines” for
young people “what the preferred relationship is and what purposes it
serves,”140 informing them of “the outward meaning of their most urgent,
personal impulses.”141 And not only youth. The sexual malleability that
children and adolescents represent in the conservative imagination also
abides in adults, who depend on the marital institution to keep them
from the temptations of a homosexual lifestyle. This reliance furnishes
one answer to liberals’ often glib challenge, “How does [same-sex
marriage] do any harm to . . . heterosexual marriage?”142 The Family
Research Council explains:

139. This Article focuses on civil marriage as a heterosexual institution, but it is
possible that marriage is vulnerable to other claims from sexual liberty insofar as it (1)
channels people into sexual relationships at all—call this an argument from celibacy—
and (2) channels people into a particular form of sexual relationship—call this an
argument from nonmonogamy. These are interesting and important possibilities, but at
each step of constitutional analysis they pose difficulties well beyond the scope of this
Article. First, the sexual liberties infringed by “marriage itself” are not so obviously
protected under Lawrence as the right to choose homosexual relations and relationships.
Second, the state’s purported rationales for reserving marriage to heterosexual couples
have been well rehearsed in same-sex marriage litigation, and so are bracketed here to
better focus on the underlying claim of burdened liberty. It would be impossible,
however, to introduce claims against marriage’s other constraints on sexual liberty without
dwelling substantially on the possibility that the institution’s alleged constitutional vice
is precisely its saving virtue—that human sexuality channeled into marriage, or some
other sexually restrictive and socially useful institution, is preferable to unfettered sexual
liberty. Third, where this Article seeks an obvious remedy—invalidation of same-sex
marriage bans—it is unclear what claimants against marital channeling would or could
demand. Do they seek abolition of all or most forms of sexual regulation specific to
marriage? If they seek abolition of marriage itself, is that remedy constitutionally
permissible? Affirmative answers to these questions are conceivable, but they are not
easy extensions from a Lawrence-based argument for same-sex marriage.
140. Maggie Gallagher, What Is Marriage For? The Public Purposes of Marriage
Law, 62 LA. L. REV. 773, 782 (2002).
141. Id. at 790.
142. Peter Sprigg, Family Research Council, Questions and Answers: What’s
Wrong with Letting Same-Sex Couples “Marry?,” FREE REPUBLIC (Dec. 28, 2003, 3:42
PM), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1047830/posts.
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[H]omosexual unions often have a more direct impact on heterosexual marriages
than one would think. . . . “[N]early 40 percent” of the 5,700 homosexual
couples who have entered into “civil unions” in Vermont “have had a previous
heterosexual marriage.” . . . [T]he popular myth that a homosexual orientation
is fixed at birth and unchangeable may have blinded us to the fact that many
supposed “homosexuals” have, in fact, had perfectly functional heterosexual
marriages. . . . “In another time or another state, some of those marriages might
have worked out. [Without t]he old stigmas, the universal standards that were
so important to family stability, . . . [these marriages] were left exposed and
vulnerable.”143

Gay divorcés are not the only individuals whom same-sex marriage,
depending on one’s perspective, will leave “vulnerable” or empowered
to choose homosexual relations and relationships. As a female bisexual
from Massachusetts explained in the wake of Goodridge,144 “Now that I
could marry a woman, I didn’t feel like in being with a woman I had to
give anything up anymore. I could be married and have everything I
would want in a committed relationship.”145
III. BISEXUALITY AND MARRIAGE
The right to choose homosexual relations and relationships is a
universal liberty. It inheres regardless of any particular individual’s
sexual orientation, just as the rights to contraception and abortion belong
even to the most doctrinaire Catholic. Nonetheless, rights usually are
claimed on behalf of those who are tangibly injured by their breach, and
“[l]egislation is measured for consistency with the Constitution by its
impact on those whose conduct it affects.”146 This Part describes one
class of individuals, amorphous yet numerous, for whom the marriage
laws’ infringement of the right to choose homosexual relations and
relationships is specially consequential.
A. Why Bisexuality?
Consider the following hypothetical from Justice Denise Johnson’s
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in Baker v. State: “Dr.

143. Id. (quoting Patricia Wen, A Civil Tradition: Data Show Same-Sex Unions in
VT. Draw a Privileged Group, BOSTON GLOBE, June 29, 2003, at B1, available at 2003
WLNR 3414546, and Jeff Jacoby, Op-Ed., The Threat from Gay Marriage, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 3, 2003, at A13, available at 2003 WLNR 3427363).
144. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
145. Pamela J. Lannutti, “This Is Not a Lesbian Wedding”: Examining Same-Sex
Marriage and Bisexual-Lesbian Couples, in BISEXUALITY AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 99,
109 (M. Paz Galupo ed., 2009).
146. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992) (“The
proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not
the group for whom the law is irrelevant.”).
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A and Dr. B both want to marry Ms. C, an X-ray technician. Dr. A may
do so because Dr. A is a man. Dr. B may not because Dr. B is a woman.”147
Commenting on this scenario, Professor Mary Anne Case identifies
Ms. C, the X-ray technician, as “one of the few bisexuals to be discussed
explicitly in same-sex marriage litigation.”148 Though nothing in Justice
Johnson’s opinion explicitly indicates Ms. C’s sexual orientation one
way or another, Professor Case’s reading imbues this imaginary love
triangle with dramatic tension—and a distinctive constitutional problematic.
Justice Johnson’s hypothetical not only makes plain why same-sex
marriage bans discriminate on the basis of sex, it also “vindicates the
rights of . . . bisexuals.”149
How so? Under what conception of bisexuality does Ms. C have a
special interest in the legalization of same-sex marriage? Typically,
three variables are employed to describe sexual orientation: attraction,
conduct, and self-identification.150 The bisexual population’s size and
composition vary markedly depending which measure is employed.
A 2008 survey sponsored by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services found that among adults under 45 years old, 16.8% of women
and 7.1% of men admit same-sex attractions and 12.7% of women and
5.6% of men have engaged in homosexual sex, while only 4.6% of
women and 2.5% of men identify as either bisexual (3.5% of women,
1.1% of men) or homosexual (1.1% of women, 1.7% of men).151 Of
course these findings depend on researchers’ success in securing honest
and accurate responses, a rare achievement where homosexuality and
bisexuality are concerned.152 Few studies have come close to replicating
findings like those of the New York City Department of Health, whose
population-based survey of more than 4,000 male residents found that
9.4% of heterosexuals and fully 10% of husbands had sex with a man in

147. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 906 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
148. Mary Anne Case, What Feminists Have To Lose in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation,
57 UCLA L. REV. 1199, 1220 (2010).
149. Id.
150. Yoshino, supra note 14, at 371.
151. See CHANDRA ET AL., supra note 16, at 31 tbls.14 & 15.
152. EDWARD O. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY:
SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 284 (1994) (“[E]stimates derived from survey
data on socially stigmatized sexual behaviors and feelings . . . are no doubt lower-bound
estimates.”).
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the past year, while 72.8% of all homosexually active men identify as
heterosexual.153
Bisexuality, as used in this Article, refers to the “state or condition of
being sexually attracted to members of both sexes.”154 It is bisexual
desire, not bisexual conduct or identification per se, that renders a person
uniquely vulnerable to pressure toward heterosexuality. Returning to
Justice Johnson’s hypothetical in Baker, suppose that Ms. C is bisexual
purely as a matter of conduct. Suppose she desires and dates men, never
women, but supplements her income as an X-ray technician with turns in
X-rated films, performing both straight and lesbian scenes. In such case
Ms. C’s bisexuality creates no meaningful rivalry between Drs. A and B;
the law of attraction, not the law of marriage, foils the same-sex match.
Now imagine instead that Ms. C is bisexual purely as a matter of identity.
No doubt most people who call themselves bisexual intend to say
something about their erotic attractions,155 but suppose that Ms. C has
known only heterosexual desires and relationships, and identifies as
bisexual for ideological reasons: to promote bisexual visibility; to establish
her prerogative to pursue same-sex relations and relationships should her
desires change over time; to assert not only alliance but identification
with LGBT people and communities.156 Whatever the reason, Mrs. C’s
“bisexuality” in this case neither validates Dr. B’s nuptial ambitions nor
instantiates her injury under a same-sex marriage ban. Desire is key.
It might be asked at this point why, even under a desire-based
conception of sexual orientation, our inquiry into marriage’s coercive
aspect should focus on bisexuals rather than exclusive homosexuals.
Why should bisexual Ms. C serve as our exemplary victim and not the
heterosexually married homosexual—say, “Boris,” a married man for

153. Preeti Pathela et al., Discordance Between Sexual Behavior and Self-Reported
Sexual Identity: A Population-Based Survey of New York City Men, 145 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 416, 419, 423 (2006).
154. Bisexuality, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com (enter
“bisexuality”; then click “Go”) (last visited May 31, 2012). Though this definition, like
the word bisexual itself, erroneously assumes only two sexes, the state’s binary classification
of sex determines spousal eligibility regardless of genetic, hormonal, anatomical, or
subjective intermediacy or disjuncture. See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231
(Tex. App. 1999) (denying post-operative male-to-female transsexual the right to sue for
husband’s wrongful death).
155. See BETH A. FIRESTEIN, BECOMING VISIBLE: COUNSELING BISEXUALS ACROSS
THE LIFESPAN, at vii, xix–xx (2007); LAUMANN ET AL., supra note 152, at 300.
156. On the political uptake of sexual identity, see Carla Golden, What’s in a
Name? Sexual Self-Identification Among Women, in THE LIVES OF LESBIANS, GAYS, AND
BISEXUALS: CHILDREN TO ADULTS 229, 231–32 (Ritch C. Savin-Williams & Kenneth M.
Cohen eds., 1996); Paula C. Rust, The Politics of Sexual Identity: Sexual Attraction and
Behavior Among Lesbian and Bisexual Women, 39 SOC. PROBS. 366, 367 (1992).

440

[VOL. 49: 415, 2012]

Sexual Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

twenty years and counting, who was “gay from the beginning (and knew
it)”?157
Certainly Ms. C’s and Boris’s experiences will share important
affinities.158 As a counselor of both homosexuals and bisexuals explains,
“[a]nyone sexually attracted to persons of their own gender must
struggle with society’s taboo against homosexuality.”159 Self-identified
homosexuals and bisexuals both say things like:
It took me years to realize I had . . . homosexual interests; I didn’t see the
relevance of early homosexual experiences; I wanted to get rid of homosexual
feelings; . . . I thought I was going through a homosexual stage; I thought I
would naturally change and become heterosexual.160

Bisexuals, though, tend to have longer careers identifying and behaving
as exclusive heterosexuals.161 Whereas nearly 90% of “gay or lesbian
individuals say they were first attracted to someone of the same sex
when they were under age 18,” fewer than 60% of bisexuals do.162 Some
interpreters believe such findings “suggest that exclusive homosexuality
tends to emerge from a deep-seated predisposition, while bisexuality is
more subject to influence by social and sexual learning.”163 But the
difference between a “deep-seated predisposition” and a susceptibility to
“social and sexual learning” is not so clear. As sociologist Paula Rodríguez
Rust writes,

157. FRITZ KLEIN & TOM SCHWARTZ, BISEXUAL AND GAY HUSBANDS: THEIR STORIES,
THEIR WORDS 45 (2001).
158. See generally id. (providing insight into the experiences of gay and bisexual
men married to women).
159. David R. Matteson, Counseling and Psychotherapy with Bisexual and Exploring
Clients, in BISEXUALITY: THE PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS OF AN INVISIBLE MINORITY 185,
186 (Beth A. Firestein ed., 1996) [hereinafter BISEXUALITY: PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS].
160. MARTIN S. WEINBERG ET AL., DUAL ATTRACTION: UNDERSTANDING BISEXUALITY
143 (1994).
161. Id. at 7; Matteson, supra note 159, at 187 (noting “[t]he delayed coming out of
bisexuals” documented in several studies).
162. GARY J. GATES, THE WILLIAMS INST., UCLA SCH. OF LAW, SEXUAL MINORITIES
IN THE 2008 GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY: COMING OUT AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 4
(2010).
163. Gary Zinik, Identity Conflict or Adaptive Flexibility? Bisexuality Reconsidered, in
BISEXUALITIES: THEORY AND RESEARCH, supra note 8, at 7, 14 (emphasis omitted)
(quoting ALAN PAUL BELL ET AL., SEXUAL PREFERENCES: ITS DEVELOPMENT IN MEN AND
WOMEN 201 (1981)).
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Because individuals are raised to assume heterosexual identities, the development
of nonheterosexual identity requires the perception of a contradiction between
one’s initial heterosexual identity and one’s own psychosexual experience.
Much experience goes unacknowledged and uncodified, particularly experience
that does not fit into an existing perceptual schema or . . . is socially disapproved.
Heterosexual identity serves as a perceptual schema that filters and guides the
interpretation of experience; experiences are given meanings that are consistent
with heterosexual identity.164

Although the psychological dynamics Rust describes are similar in
substance for bisexuals and homosexuals, the demands of heterosexual
conformity often operate differently for members of each group.
Exclusive homosexuals, who have no choice consistent with their desires
but to pursue homosexual relations and relationships, often cite their
affirmation of gay or lesbian identity as the moment when they renounced
heterosexual intimacy.165 Bisexuals generally do not share that experience.
Uptake of bisexual identity rarely entails a disavowal of heterosexual
relations and relationships.166 Even after coming out to themselves and
others, bisexuals are “able to choose which side of their sexuality to
express”167 and so continue, as we shall see with marriage, to feel “pressure
. . . to exercise their heterosexual option.”168
The channeling of bisexuals into heterosexuality is ultimately “a
special case of a general phenomenon.”169 In its legal mechanisms, the
pressure brought to bear on bisexuals is essentially the same as that
imposed on homosexuals and even heterosexuals, who are not so obviously
victimized by it. What makes bisexuals unique vis-à-vis homosexuals is,
again, their special vulnerability to this pressure. An exclusive homosexual
channeled into heterosexual marriage may suffer more intensely than
would a bisexual in the same situation, but this is just why the average
bisexual is so much more likely to conform. That conformity’s harm
may be lighter for bisexuals than homosexuals does not mean that they
164. Paula C. Rust, “Coming Out” in the Age of Social Constructionism: Sexual Identity
Formation Among Lesbian and Bisexual Women, 7 GENDER & SOC. 50, 71 (1993).
165. See, e.g., BOYS LIKE US: GAY WRITERS TELL THEIR COMING OUT STORIES
(Patrick Merla ed., 1996) (recounting the “coming out” experiences of homosexual
men); THE COMING OUT STORIES (Susan J. Wolfe & Julia Penelope Stanley eds., 1980)
(describing the “coming out” experiences of lesbians).
166. See, e.g., BI ANY OTHER NAME: BISEXUAL PEOPLE SPEAK OUT (Loraine Hutchins &
Lani Kaahumanu eds., 1991) (describing common bisexual experiences); KLEIN & SCHWARTZ,
supra note 157, at 1.
167. SUE GEORGE, WOMEN AND BISEXUALITY 103 (1993).
168. Gilbert H. Herdt, A Comment on Cultural Attributes and Fluidity of
Bisexuality, 10 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 53, 59 (1985). In Fricke v. Lynch, for example, a
teenager who wished to bring a same-sex date to the prom emphasized to his principal a
“commitment to homosexuality[,] . . . indicat[ing] that although it was possible he might
someday be bisexual, at present he is exclusively homosexual and could not
conscientiously date girls.” 491 F. Supp. 381, 383 (D.R.I. 1980).
169. Thanks to Clifford Rosky for this elegant formulation.
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suffer no injury at all. The state curtails their autonomy by withholding
a choice—same-sex marriage—they may or may not ever wish to exercise,
but whose preservation is valuable in itself and valuable for the
homosexual relations and relationships it enables among individuals who
are inclined to wed.
Bisexuality also offers a heuristic possibility that exclusive homosexuality
does not. Although few persons are equally desirous of women and
men,170 the theoretical possibility of indifference and the reality of its
innumerable approximations permit keener appreciation of external
forces’ role in shaping sexual choice. It is characteristic of indifference
to yield. If Ms. C is unsure whether to date male Dr. A or female Dr. B,
she can look to the overwhelming consensus of culture, memorialized in
the law of marriage, to resolve her indecision. No doubt Ms. C’s choice
may be affected by considerations other than, say, conformity to social
expectation or a wish to raise children in a legally secure household: Dr.
A’s wealth, Dr. B’s youth, et cetera. But it is perfectly plausible that
Ms. C’s aspiration to marry, answerable only by a male suitor, could be
as determinative of her choice as Dr. A’s money or Dr. B’s immaturity.
Suppose Ms. C is creating an online dating profile and must indicate
whether she is interested in men, women, or both. Imagine, again, that
she is truly indifferent to sex but anxious for approval or concerned to
protect her children’s welfare. Which box will she choose?
A final definitional issue concerns latent bisexuality. What if Ms. C’s
dual-sex desire is unconscious, repressed, suppressed? Does she share
the bisexual’s special stake in legalization of same-sex marriage? This
question of latency is distinct from the still touchier issue of whether
“everyone” is “really,”171 “inherently,”172 or “innately”173 bisexual, though
the two problems are theoretically and historically related. Sigmund Freud,
the prophet of the unconscious, repeatedly claimed “that every human

170. Paula C. Rodríguez Rust, Review of Statistical Findings About Bisexual Behavior,
Feelings, and Identities, in BISEXUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES: A SOCIAL SCIENCE
READER 129, 161–62 (Paula C. Rodríguez Rust ed., 2000) (collecting studies).
171. See Robyn Ochs, Bisexual Etiquette: Helpful Hints for Bisexuals Working with
Lesbians and Gay Men, in BISEXUAL POLITICS: THEORIES, QUERIES, AND VISIONS 237,
237 (Naomi Tucker ed., 1995) (urging bisexuals to refrain from claiming that “everyone’s
really bisexual”).
172. See ROBERT H. ALLEN, THE CLASSICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN HOMOPHOBIA 113
(2006) (calling humans “inherently bisexual”).
173. See FRANK S. PITTMAN III, MAN ENOUGH: FATHERS, SONS, AND THE SEARCH
FOR MASCULINITY 182 (1993) (affirming “the innate bisexuality of all men”).
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being is bisexual[;] . . . his libido is distributed, either in a manifest or a
latent fashion, over objects of both sexes.”174 Freud’s view was and
continues to be shared by numerous psychologists and psychiatrists.175
More than a few anthropologists have endorsed some version of it as
well. Drawing on research into nearly 200 cultures, Clellan Ford and
Frank Beach’s classic Patterns of Sexual Behavior argued that exclusive
homosexuality and exclusive heterosexuality are “extremes represent[ing]
movement away from the original, intermediate . . . capacity for both
forms of sexual expression.”176 Margaret Mead drew a less sweeping
but still impressive conclusion: “Even a superficial look at other societies
and some groups in our own society should be enough to convince us
that a very large number of human beings—probably a majority—are
bisexual in their potential capacity for love.”177
Whether or not most people are “really” latent bisexuals, it is highly
unlikely that no one is. Not only Freud and Mead but also many ordinary
individuals attest to the phenomenon’s reality. Just as many self-professed
homosexuals recount a discovery of same-sex attraction relatively late in
life, so do many bisexuals. The trope is as at least equally common to
bisexual coming-out narratives as homosexual ones.178 Indeed it is
telling, given bisexuality’s consistent erasure in same-sex marriage
litigation,179 that latency is at issue in both of bisexuality’s most sustained
appearances in these cases. In Perry v. Schwarzenegger, plaintiffs’ trial
counsel Ted Olson took pains to show that his client Sandy Stier, who
previously had been married to a man, really is and always was a
lesbian.180 The fact of Stier’s escape from bisexual ascription, to which
we will return, is for now less important than the narrative by which that

174. SIGMUND FREUD, ANALYSIS TERMINABLE AND INTERMINABLE (1937), reprinted
in 23 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND
FREUD 216, 244 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1964).
175. See JOHN MONEY & PATRICIA TUCKER, SEXUAL SIGNATURES: ON BEING A MAN
OR A WOMAN 16 (1975); WILHELM STEKEL, BI-SEXUAL LOVE 39–41 (James S. Van
Teslaar trans., 1922); Havelock Ellis, Sexo-Aesthetic Inversion, 34 ALIENIST &
NEUROLOGIST 249, 279 (1913); Joyce McDougall, Sexuality and the Neosexual, 25
MODERN PSYCHOANALYSIS 155, 158 (2000); Robert E. Gould, If It Isn’t an Illness, What
Is It? What We Don’t Know About Homosexuality, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 24, 1974, at
13, 63.
176. CLELLAN S. FORD & FRANK A. BEACH, PATTERNS OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 258–
59 (1951).
177. Margaret Mead, Bisexuality: What’s It All About?, REDBOOK, Jan. 1975, at 29.
178. See generally BI ANY OTHER NAME, supra note 166 (cataloguing stories from
members of the bisexual community); GETTING BI: VOICES OF BISEXUALS AROUND THE
WORLD (Robyn Ochs & Sarah E. Rowley eds., 2005) (same).
179. See infra Part IV.A.
180. Transcript of Proceedings at 161–62, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp.
2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292-VRW).
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escape was attempted—a tale of latent sexuality so recognizable that it
required no psychological explanation, expert or otherwise:
Q.
A.

You had no feeling at that point in time married to a man that you were a
lesbian?
At that time I did not.181

We encounter a similar story, now with a bisexual hero, in Varnum v.
Brien.182 Testifying as an expert witness about the difficulty of
ascertaining “the numbers of gays and lesbians” in Iowa and nationally,
sociologist Pepper Schwartz saw fit to bring up her brother-in-law,
Howard.183 “For 45 years or more, [Howard] was a married heterosexual
guy.”184 Then Howard “decided that there was a part of him he hadn’t
explored.”185 So he “gets on the Internet, . . . starts talking to other
guys,” and before long “realizes this is a really important part of him that
he wants to know more about.”186 Howard “gets involved, falls in love,”
and ultimately partners with a man.187 Today, “if you asked Howard how
he defined himself, he would say bisexual.”188
Who knows how many Howards there are in the world.189
Unconscious bisexuality may be extremely rare or it may be nearly
universal, accounting for everyone whose felt desires are exclusively
heterosexual or homosexual. This Article affirms only that people like
Howard exist and that uncertainty as to their prevalence should not
exclude them from the class of individuals whose sexuality is specially
targeted by compulsion toward heterosexuality. Almost by definition,
the unconscious is susceptible to social conditioning,190 no doubt through
operations that are bafflingly complex, hypercontextual, sometimes
counterintuitive, and variable over time. To provisionally part ways
181. Id. at 162. For a collection of “awakening” narratives like Stier’s, see CARREN
STROCK, MARRIED WOMEN WHO LOVE WOMEN 3–22 (2d ed. 2008).
182. 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
183. Transcript of Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Pepper Judith Schwartz at
55–56, Varnum v. Brien, No. CV5965 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Aug. 30, 2007), 2007 WL 2814089.
184. Id. at 56.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 56–57.
188. Id. at 57.
189. For a number of poignant accounts like Howard’s, see KLEIN & SCHWARTZ,
supra note 157.
190. FLOYD HENRY ALLPORT, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 278 (1952) (arguing that “the
attitude of social conformity,” “a basic human tendency,” is a matter of “submit[ting]
one’s self unconsciously” to external mores).
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with Freud as to bisexuality’s alleged universality, conscious in some
and unconscious in most, is not to dispense with his lifelong affirmation
of the powerful effect that civilization, and particularly its law, exerts
upon eros.191 Counting heterosexual object-choice among “the tasks
implicit” in proper sexual development, Freud held that “the strongest
force” working against homosexual orientation, apart from the independently
insufficient “attraction which the opposing sexual characters exercise
upon one another,” is “its authoritative prohibition by society.”192
Anthropological perspectives again affirm Freud’s basic point. Mead,
for example, held that human beings’ careers as heterosexuals, homosexuals,
or bisexuals are, “in fact, a consequence . . . of the particular beliefs and
prejudices of the society they live in and, to some extent, of their own
life history.”193 Because unconscious desire, certainly no less than
conscious attraction, is susceptible to cultural “prohibition[s],” “beliefs,”
and “prejudices,”194 latent bisexuals are part of this Article’s constituency.
B. Compulsory Heterosexuality and Bisexual Existence
Though the term compulsory heterosexuality did not originate with
Adrienne Rich, her essay on the subject was instrumental in elaborating
and popularizing it. The central question of Compulsory Heterosexuality
and Lesbian Existence was “whether in a different context, or other
things being equal, women would choose heterosexual coupling and
marriage.”195 In light of plentiful if usually overlooked evidence that
many women find among themselves their most reliable, nonexploitative,
191. See SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1930), reprinted in
21 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND
FREUD 64 (James Strachey ed. & trans., Hogarth Press 1961); SIGMUND FREUD, TOTEM
AND T ABOO (1913), reprinted in 13 T HE S TANDARD E DITION OF THE C OMPLETE
PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 1 (James Strachey ed. & trans., Hogarth
Press 1953); see also HERBERT MARCUSE, EROS AND CIVILIZATION: A PHILOSOPHICAL
INQUIRY INTO FREUD (1955).
192. SIGMUND FREUD, THREE ESSAYS ON SEXUALITY (1905), reprinted in 7 THE
STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 135,
229 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1953) (“Where inversion is not regarded as a crime it
will be found that it answers fully to the sexual inclinations of no small number of
people.”).
193. Mead, supra note 177, at 29; see also Gilbert Herdt, Bisexuality and the
Causes of Homosexuality: The Case of the Sambia, in BISEXUALITIES: THE IDEOLOGY
AND PRACTICE OF SEXUAL CONTACT WITH BOTH MEN AND WOMEN 157, 162 (Erwin J.
Haeberle & Rolf Gindorf eds., 1998) (“[S]ocial and cultural factors very broadly channel
and limit sexual variation in human populations. Sexual laws, codes, and roles do
restrict the range and intensity of sexual practices.”).
194. See FREUD, supra note 174, at 229; Mead, supra note 177, at 29.
195. Rich, supra note 15, at 633; see also id. at 653 (noting that “[c]ompulsory
heterosexuality” was named a “‘crime[] against women’ by the Brussels Tribunal on Crimes
against Women in 1976”).
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sustaining, and passionate relationships, Rich suggested that what looked
simply like social or emotional preference might, in different political
circumstances, admit a sexual possibility or indeed constitute a sexual
preference.196
One of the most striking things about Rich’s essay is its insistent
linkage of compulsory heterosexuality and marriage. It asks how “women
have been convinced that marriage, and sexual orientation toward men,
are inevitable,” and it catalogues “the covert socializations and the overt
forces which have channeled women into marriage and heterosexual
romance.”197 One of the essay’s most powerful passages undertakes a
swift and sweeping answer to the suggestion that women “who married
[and] stayed married . . . ‘preferred’ or ‘chose’ heterosexuality”:
Women have married because it was necessary, in order to survive economically,
in order to have children who would not suffer economic deprivation or social
ostracism, in order to remain respectable, in order to do what was expected of
women[,] because . . . they wanted to feel ‘normal,’ and because heterosexual
romance has been represented as the great female adventure, duty, and
fulfillment.198

Even as Rich conceded of marriage that “[w]ithin the institution exist . . .
qualitative differences of experience,” the possibility that some women
might be deliriously happy with their husbands could not excuse “the
absence of choice [that] remains the great unacknowledged reality.”199
Consider in light of Rich’s critique the sexual biographies of two
women—“Gwen” and “Monica”—interviewed for psychologist Lisa
Diamond’s book, Sexual Fluidity:
Gwen, who is now married to a man, never considered herself a very sexual
person. When she was nineteen, she became unexpectedly romantically and
sexually involved with a close female friend, and they carried on an intense
affair for more than a year. She thinks that most women probably have some
degree of attraction for women, whether or not they acknowledge or act on it.
But Gwen thinks it is unlikely that she will ever again be involved with a
woman. Most of her attractions are focused on her husband these days. When
she does find herself drawn to a woman, the desire is not nearly as intense as
her feelings for her husband. Nonetheless, she still has more sexual fantasies
about women than about men.200

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 632, 637, 646–47, 652, 657.
Id. at 640, 636.
Id. at 654.
Id. at 659.
LISA M. DIAMOND, SEXUAL FLUIDITY: UNDERSTANDING WOMEN’S LOVE
DESIRE 92 (2008).

AND
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Monica admits that she sometimes thinks the only reason she is ever attracted
to men is that she has been socialized to find them attractive. But other times,
she feels that those attractions are authentic. Her emotional bonds with women
are more intense and satisfying, but she has never been involved with a
woman. Her friends convinced her that because she gets involved only with
men, she cannot legitimately consider herself bisexual. They urged her to
“come out as heterosexual.” She is now happily married to a man who considers
her to be “100 percent straight—end of story.” Her husband is not aware that
she is still attracted to women and fantasizes about them several times a
week.201

Marriage clearly has shaped the heterosexual destiny that Gwen and
Monica are living today. But based only on these brief sketches—of
characters with mighty, current investments in their families and with
motivations mysterious even to themselves202—it is difficult to isolate
precisely which cultural and legal pressures, if any, marshaled these
wives to the altar. Some of Diamond’s other interviews, however, did
manage to uncover reasons why most bisexual women over time
“gravitate[] toward men.”203 Participants “repeatedly mentioned” “the
relative ease and social acceptability of pursuing other-sex versus samesex relationships.”204 One respondent, age nineteen, explained, “It’s like
there’s this track for men, and it’s just easier to get on that track. But
because of society, there is no track for my feelings for women.”205
Another woman, age thirty, affirmed, “[W]hen I look to the future I see
myself more easily falling into a relationship with a guy. . . . I do still
think of myself as bisexual, so I guess I’m leaning more toward men . . .
due to more practical reasons, societal reasons.”206
Sue George’s study of 142 bisexual women revealed similar
patterns.207 Sixty-eight of her respondents had a primary relationship
with a man, twenty-eight of them marital.208 Many of these women
affirmed the importance of “social factors” in shaping their sexual
choices.209 Specific reasons, to the extent they could be articulated,
ranged from the most private imperatives to the most public incentives.
“I’m not quite sure why I got married,” said one.210 “Basically, not to
hurt my family’s feelings, for tax incentives, and to some extent to
201. Id. at 91.
202. One of Diamond’s subjects asked, “Am I attracted to a particular man because
he’s great, or because society has just conditioned me to be turned on by men?” Id. at
129.
203. Id. at 117.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 129.
206. Id. at 119.
207. GEORGE, supra note 167, at 64.
208. Id. at 69, 88.
209. DIAMOND, supra note 200, at 117.
210. GEORGE, supra note 167, at 88.
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provide my child with security.”211 That last word—security—came up
in George’s study with special frequency.212 Security is one reason why
anxious parents, especially mothers, encourage their bisexual children,
especially daughters, to “do the right thing,”213 find “Mr. Right,”214 make
it legal.
Dorian Solot and Marshall Miller affirm that bisexuals of both sexes
“get married for the same reasons most Americans marry: because it is
expected of them; because marriage offers community legitimacy, social
status, legal protections, and sometimes health insurance; or because it is
a way to demonstrate love and commitment to a partner.”215 They marry
“to avoid family censure, develop their careers, and raise children with
societal approval.”216 And like some homosexuals, they may marry out
of failure to acknowledge, or in “conscious flight” from, homosexual
attractions.217 Eli Coleman’s studies of bisexuals’ reasons for marrying
reveal just such mixed motivations.218 Moreover his male respondents
unanimously cited “a “perceived lack of intimacy in the homosexual
world” among their reasons for marrying women,219 confirming another
study’s finding that bisexuals avoid same-sex relationships because there
are “few if any of the external factors . . . that cemented and bonded
heterosexual couples together such as a traditional state-sanctioned
marriage.”220
Even when bisexuals pursue relationships with both men and women,
these experiences often teach that their best bet is the one society

211. Id.
212. See id. at 87–88, 90.
213. Id. at 88.
214. Robyn Ochs, From the Closet to the Stage, in BI ANY OTHER NAME, supra
note 166, at 210, 212; GEORGE, supra note 167, at 89.
215. Dorian Solot & Marshall Miller, Unmarried Bisexuals: Distinct Voices on
Marriage and Family, 1 J. BISEXUALITY, no. 4, 2001, at 81, 84.
216. Robyn Ochs, Biphobia: It Goes More Than Two Ways, in BISEXUALITY:
PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS, supra note 159, at 217, 229.
217. Stuart J. Edser & John D. Shea, An Exploratory Investigation of Bisexual Men
in Monogamous, Heterosexual Marriages, 2 J. BISEXUALITY, no. 4, 2002, at 5, 9 (summarizing
research on “why gay or bisexual men . . . marry”).
218. See Eli Coleman, Integration of Male Bisexuality and Marriage, 11 J.
HOMOSEXUALITY 189, 194–95 (1985) [hereinafter Coleman, Integration]; see also Eli
Coleman, Bisexual Women in Marriages, 11 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 87, 91–92 (1985) (citing
“love for husband,” “societal pressures” to marry, “interest in having . . . children,” and a
wish to “overcome same-sex feelings”).
219. Coleman, Integration, supra note 218, at 194–95.
220. WEINBERG ET AL., supra note 160, at 184.
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underwrites. “With society as it is,” says one woman, “I prefer to be
married to a loving, gentle, intelligent, caring young man. If society
w[ere] different I would not care at all.”221 Just how many bisexuals
pick “the path of least resistance” is impossible to know.222 Though
reliable numbers are scarce, it appears that most bisexuals are, as one
man put it, “committed . . . to the institution of marriage.”223 Selfidentified bisexuals in the 2008 General Social Survey were only 20%
less likely to be currently married than self-identified heterosexuals.224
Diamond’s longitudinal study of “bisexual and unlabeled” women found
that, by the end of ten years, 80% were “in a committed monogamous
relationship,” two-thirds of which were with men; “of these, half resulted in
marriage.”225 A study of active members of San Francisco’s Bisexual
Center—no bastion of homophobia—found that many participants were
or had been married and that “[e]ven among those who were divorced, a
substantial number expressed a desire to [remarry].”226 It should be
stressed again that such trends describe only self-identified bisexuals. It
would be startling if bisexuals’ true rates of heterosexual coupling and
marriage were not significantly higher.
Precisely because many, probably most, bisexuals “live hidden in the
shadows of heterosexuality,”227 those who are politicized frequently and
often explicitly invoke compulsory heterosexuality to describe their
constituency’s subordination.228 Bisexual interrogations of this demand
emphasize its disciplinary aspect—its preference for reward over
punishment, and specifically its imposition through “heterosexual

221. Id. at 259.
222. DIAMOND, supra note 200, at 192.
223. KLEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 157, at 35.
224. Email from Gary J. Gates, Senior Scholar, The Williams Inst., to Michael
Boucai (Jan. 12, 2011, 10:23:22 PST) (on file with author) (supplying raw data from the
General Social Survey 2008).
225. DIAMOND, supra note 200, at 114–15.
226. WEINBERG ET AL., supra note 160, at 93.
227. Amanda Yoshizaki, Breaking the Rules: Constructing a Bisexual Feminist
Marriage, in CLOSER TO HOME: BISEXUALITY & FEMINISM 155, 156 (Elizabeth Reba
Weise ed., 1992).
228. See, e.g., Elizabeth Armstrong, Traitors to the Cause? Understanding the
Lesbian/Gay “Bisexuality Debates,” in BISEXUAL POLITICS, supra note 171, at 199, 201,
203–05; Elias Farajajé-Jones, Fluid Desire: Race, HIV/AIDS, and Bisexual Politics, in
BISEXUAL POLITICS, supra note 171, at 119, 123; Laura Johnson, Making My Own Way,
in BI ANY OTHER NAME, supra note 166, at 40; Robyn Ochs, Bisexuality, Feminism, Men
and Me, in CLOSER TO HOME, supra note 227, at 127, 127, 130; Erich Steinman,
Interpreting the Invisibility of Male Bisexuality: Theories, Interactions, Politics, in
BISEXUALITY IN THE LIVES OF MEN: FACTS AND FICTIONS 15, 40 (Brett Beemyn & Erich
Steinman eds., 2001); Amanda Udis-Kessler, Bisexuality in an Essentialist World:
Toward an Understanding of Biphobia, in BISEXUALITY: A READER AND SOURCEBOOK
51, 56 (Thomas Geller ed., 1990).
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privilege.”229 Like homosexuals, bisexuals describe heterosexual privilege
as both an urgent political problem and a banal background reality.
What sets their literature apart is its insistent representation of such
privilege as a pervasive, quotidian dilemma, rather than the scorned
sanctuary of an abandoned closet.230 Marriage, unsurprisingly, figures in
these accounts as heterosexual privilege’s most powerful and immediate
association, its foremost example, the part that stands for the whole.231
Because it is so widely thought that bisexuals can and should succumb
to the demands of compulsory heterosexuality and the enticements of
heterosexual privilege, and because bisexuals so frequently do succumb
to them, “[s]exual freedom” is widely considered the “dominant ideology”
of a distinctively bisexual politics.232 “At this moment in human sexual
229. See, e.g., WEINBERG ET AL., supra note 160, at 19–20; Amber Ault, Ambiguous
Identity in an Unambiguous Sex/Gender Structure: The Case of Bisexual Women, in
BISEXUALITY: A CRITICAL READER 167, 179 (Merl Storr ed., 1999); Tamara Bower,
Bisexual Women, Feminist Politics, in BISEXUAL POLITICS, supra note 171, at 99, 100;
Mary Bradford, The Bisexual Experience: Living in a Dichotomous Culture, in CURRENT
RESEARCH ON BISEXUALITY 7, 15 (Ronald C. Fox ed., 2004); Glossary to BI ANY OTHER
NAME, supra note 166, at 369; Liz A. Highleyman, Identity and Ideas: Strategies for
Bisexuals, in BISEXUAL POLITICS, supra note 171, at 73, 88; Naomi Mezey, Dismantling
the Wall: Bisexuality and the Possibilities of Sexual Identity Classification Based on
Acts, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 98, 133 (1995); Ochs, supra note 216, at 217–20, 229,
235; Solot & Miller, supra note 215, at 83–84; Udis-Kessler, supra note 228, at 58. For
an impressive list of “heterosexual privileges,” see Devon W. Carbado, Straight Out of
the Closet, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 76, 116–22 (2000).
230. See, e.g., FIRESTEIN, supra note 155, at 117 (counting struggles with “heterosexual
privilege” among the “issues” that bring bisexual men into therapy); Amanda UdisKessler, Closer to Home: Bisexual Feminism and the Transformation of Hetero/sexism,
in CLOSER TO HOME, supra note 227, at 183, 184 (noting that “bisexual women experience
heterosexual privilege differently than either lesbians or heterosexual women do, given
our capacity to be on either end of its effects”).
231. See, e.g., FIRESTEIN, supra note 155, at 118; AMANDA UDIS-KESSLER, QUEER
INCLUSION IN THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH 106 (2008); Bower, supra note 229, at
99; Glossary to BI ANY OTHER NAME, supra note 166, at 369; Solot & Miller, supra note
215, at 83–84; Yoshizaki, supra note 227, at 155–156; Julie Ellen Hartman, Bi Outside
the Bedroom: The Performance of Bisexual Identity Among Women in “Heterosexual”
Relationships 105–07 (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University) (on
file with author).
232. WEINBERG ET AL., supra note 160, at 8; see also Valerie Barlow, Bisexuality
and Feminism: One Black Woman’s Perspective, in BISEXUAL HORIZONS: POLITICS,
HISTORIES, LIVES 38, 38 (Sharon Rose et al. eds., 1996) (identifying bisexuality with “the
freedom to choose . . . partners on the basis of [one’s own] criteria rather than on the
basis of a societally prescribed sexual choice”); Loraine Hutchins, Bisexuality: Politics
and Community, in BISEXUALITY: PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS, supra note 159, at 240,
247 (“[S]ame-sex love can . . . be a choice and, like religion, also deserves defense on
that ground.”); Zélie Pollon, Naming Her Destiny: June Jordan Speaks on Bisexuality, in
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history,” wrote activist Rebecca Shuster in 1987, “the presence of bisexuals
conspicuously reopens the issue of sexual choice.”233 More than two
decades later, with same-sex marriage dominating the gay rights agenda,
bisexuality continues to provide, as Marjorie Garber put it, “a crucial
paradigm . . . for thinking differently about human freedom.”234
“[B]isexuals . . . claim a right to choose their own sexual relationships,”235 a
right heavily burdened by the restriction of marriage to different-sex
couples. A 2007 forum on bisexuality and same-sex marriage underscored
legalization’s capacity to “remove[] a barrier to [bisexuals’] relational
freedom” and thus to support “true freedom of choice” as between
homosexual and heterosexual relationships.236 A participant from
Massachusetts said, “I was so excited that marriage was being recognized
for everybody. . . . [F]or me, being bi has always been about making my
own choices and not having society . . . make them for me.”237
IV. BRINGING OUT BISEXUALITY
Bisexuality is “virtually invisible” in same-sex marriage litigation.238
Though many of the organizations that serve as plaintiffs’ advocates or
amici purport in their mission statements to represent bisexuals along

PLURAL DESIRES: WRITING BISEXUAL WOMEN’S REALITIES 77, 79 (Bisexual Anthology
Collective ed., 1995) (“The fact is that people who call themselves bisexual . . . are fighting
for sexual freedom.”).
233. Rebecca Shuster, Sexuality as a Continuum: The Bisexual Identity, in LESBIAN
PSYCHOLOGIES: EXPLORATIONS AND CHALLENGES 56, 62 (Bos. Lesbian Psychologies
Collective ed., 1987).
234. MARJORIE GARBER, VICE VERSA: BISEXUALITY AND THE EROTICISM OF EVERYDAY
LIFE 89–90 (1995) (answering the question, “What . . . is a bisexual politics?”).
235. MARK BLASIUS, GAY AND LESBIAN POLITICS: SEXUALITY AND THE EMERGENCE
OF A NEW ETHIC 148 (1994). Bisexual actress Cynthia Nixon recently made headlines by
expressing resentment at the notion that people only enter homosexual relationships
because they are not drawn to heterosexual relationships: “Why can’t it be a choice?
Why is that any less legitimate?” Alex Witchel, Life after ‘Sex,’ N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan.
22, 2012, at 24, 27.
236. Lannutti, supra note 145, at 109.
237. Id.
238. Heron Greenesmith, Drawing Bisexuality Back into the Picture: How Bisexuality
Fits into LGBT Legal Strategy Ten Years After Bisexual Erasure, 17 CARDOZO J.L. &
GENDER 65, 78 (2010); see also Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar: Political Process
Theory Through the Lens of the Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1366 n.16
(2011) (noting that same-sex marriage decisions “frequently refer only to ‘gay’ or ‘gay
and lesbian’ persons, and have not separately analyzed at any length the implications for
bisexual . . . persons”). Professor Schacter is referring here to the question of whether
sexual orientation is a suspect classification, and specifically whether the class harmed
by same-sex marriage bans is “political[ly] powerless[],” id. at 1365–66, but her
observation holds for all aspects of judicial analysis in these cases.
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with gay men, lesbians, and sometimes, transgender people,239 these are
the very groups that most concertedly ignore bisexual existence. If the
subject surfaces at all in these cases, it is same-sex marriage opponents
who raise it. However fleeting and infrequent, conservative invocations
of bisexuality shed light on the reasons for “LGBT” advocates’ meticulous
avoidance of the subject. This Part describes those reasons and contests
their legal and strategic necessity.
A. Bisexual Erasure in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation
When plaintiffs in same-sex marriage cases are affirmatively assigned
a sexual identity—by their lawyers, amici, or judges—that identity is
invariably “gay” or “lesbian.”240 Not a single plaintiff is clearly identified
as bisexual. Occasionally a sexual history involving both men and women
can be inferred from references to children conceived in a prior
heterosexual relationship and currently raised by one natural parent and
a same-sex partner. Though two-thirds of children reared in “same-sex
households” come into being this way,241 such offspring account for a
relatively small number of those brought to courts’ attention.242 Of the
ten children raised by plaintiff couples in Connecticut, the seven raised
by plaintiffs in Oregon, and the five raised by plaintiffs in Iowa, none
were conceived in a current parent’s prior heterosexual relationship.243

239. See, e.g., About Us, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/about-us
(last visited May 31, 2012); About NCLR, NAT’L CENTER FOR LESBIAN RTS., http://
www.nclrights.org/site/PageServer?pagename=about_overview (last visited May 31, 2012).
240. See, e.g., Brief of Appellants at 1, Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006)
(No. 58,398) [hereinafter Lewis Appellants’ Brief] (“Plaintiffs are lesbian and gay
individuals . . . .”).
241. Gary J. Gates & Adam P. Romero, Parenting by Gay Men and Lesbians:
Beyond the Current Research, in MARRIAGE AND FAMILY: PERSPECTIVES AND COMPLEXITIES
227, 235 (H. Elizabeth Peters & Claire M. Kamp Dush eds., 2009); see also Dan Black
et al., Demographics of the Gay and Lesbian Population in the United States: Evidence
from Available Systematic Data Sources, 37 DEMOGRAPHY 139, 150 (2000) (“Many of
the children in gay and lesbian households recorded in the census were probably born in
previous marriages.”).
242. See Complaint at 7, 16, 18, Samuels v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, No. 196704 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 7, 2004) (describing three sets of plaintiff couples raising
children from previous relationships).
243. See Kerrigan Complaint, supra note 4, passim; Li Complaint, supra note 90, at
5–10; Final Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 6, 8, Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862
(Iowa 2009) (No. 07-1499) [hereinafter Varnum Appellees’ Brief].
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Almost without exception, courts and parties draw no distinction
between a homosexual couple and a couple of homosexuals.244 Their
interchangeable use of “same-sex” couples and “gay and lesbian” couples, a
penchant noticed by bisexual commentators,245 reflects more than the
obvious fact that the relationships in question are homosexual. Even as
the adjectives gay and lesbian properly modify collective nouns like
couple, family, and household, they also describe the class of individuals
that plaintiffs are said to represent—the class of “homosexuals.”246 At
every turn, judges and advocates speak of “homosexual persons,”247 “gay
persons,”248 “gays,”249 “gay men and women,”250 “gays and lesbians,”251
“gay men and lesbians,”252 “lesbians and gay men,”253 “gay and lesbian

244. A review of hundreds of filings—opinions, briefs, and complaints—in samesex marriage cases since 1991 yields but a handful of exceptions to the rule of bisexual
invisibility. Briefs of the American Psychological Association supporting same-sex
marriage usually include a boilerplate footnote conceding their “focus . . . on . . . gay
men and lesbians” even though “many bisexual persons are involved in committed samesex relationships.” See, e.g., Brief of American Psychological Ass’n & New Jersey
Psychological Ass’n as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 9 n.4, Lewis
v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (No. A-2244-03T5). The
Maryland Court of Appeals, declining to recognize a right to same-sex marriage, referred
consistently to “gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons,” as did a brief filed in Massachusetts
in support of same-sex marriage by professors of constitutional law. Conaway v. Deane,
932 A.2d 571 passim (Md. 2007); Brief of Amicus Curiae Professors of Expression &
Constitutional Law passim, Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.
2003) (No. SJC-08860). And in a statement starkly at odds with Judge Walker’s
determination in Perry that “Proposition 8 eliminates a right only a gay man or a lesbian
would exercise,” plaintiffs in California state court correctly argued that that no one “but
a gay or bisexual man (or woman) would want to marry another man (or woman).”
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 996 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom.
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012); Marriage Cases Respondent’s Brief,
supra note 85, at 40.
245. Laurie J. Kendall, Dancing with My Grandma: Talking with Robyn Ochs
About Complex Identities and Simple Messages in the Marriage Equality Movement, in
BISEXUALITY AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 145, at 181, 191; Lannutti, supra
note 145, at 118; Ramki Ramakrishnan, Bisexual Politics for Lesbians and Gay Men, in
GETTING BI, supra note 178, at 198, 198; Solot & Miller, supra note 215, at 87.
246. See Complaint for Declaratory Relief by Same-Sex Married Couples
Challenging the Constitutionality of the Family Code at 3, Clinton v. Schwarzenegger,
No. CGC-04-429542 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 2004) [hereinafter Clinton Complaint].
247. See, e.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 962.
248. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 466 (Conn.
2008).
249. See, e.g., Clinton Complaint, supra note 246, passim.
250. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curaie in Support of Respondents Challenging the
Marriage Exclusion at 2, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (No. S147999).
251. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997 (N.D. Cal 2010),
aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).
252. See, e.g., Brief & Appendix of Defendants-Respondents at 26, Lewis v. Harris,
908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) (No. 58,389).
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people,”254 “lesbian and gay people,”255 “gay and lesbian individuals,”256
“lesbian and gay citizens,”257 “gay and lesbian residents,”258 “gay and
lesbian colleagues, family members and neighbors,”259 “lesbian and gay
New Yorkers,”260 “lesbian and gay Oregonians,”261 “the Commonwealth’s
gay and lesbian citizens.”262
Bisexual invisibility in same-sex marriage litigation tends to be a
negative phenomenon—erasure by mere omission—but sometimes it
happens through affirmative, active deletion. In the Supreme Court of
California, plaintiffs argued that the state “intentionally denies lesbians
and gay men the right to marry, even though it also has determined that
there is absolutely nothing wrong with gay and lesbian families.”263 In
fact, the state’s determination about these families, recorded in its Domestic
Partner Act, was that “many lesbian, gay, and bisexual Californians have
formed lasting, committed, and caring relationships with persons of the
same sex.”264 Plaintiffs quote this language elsewhere in their brief,
dropping the legislature’s reference to “bisexuals.”265
A more dramatic instance of bisexual erasure was mentioned earlier in
this Article: the exchange in Perry v. Schwarzenegger where plaintiffs’
253. See, e.g., Brief of Legal Momentum as Amicus Curiae in Support of PlaintiffsAppellants at 32, Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (No.
A-2244-03T5).
254. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009).
255. See, e.g., Intervenors’ Cross-Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief
para. 3, Thomasson v. Newsom, No. CGC 04-428794 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 2004),
2004 WL 5134446.
256. See, e.g., Application to File Amicus Curiae Brief of the American
Psychoanalytic Ass’n et al. Urging Reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeal at 1,
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (No. S147999).
257. Lewis Appellants’ Brief, supra note 240, at 15.
258. Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief at 1, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 3:09-cv -02292-VRW).
259. Brief of Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders as Amici Curiae at 27,
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) (No. 103434/04) [hereinafter Hernandez
GLAD Brief].
260. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3, Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d 1 (No. 103434/04)
[hereinafter Hernandez Appellants’ Brief].
261. Li Complaint, supra note 90, at 20.
262. Hernandez GLAD Brief, supra note 259, at 22.
263. Marriage Cases Respondent’s Brief, supra note 85, at 6 (capitalization
altered).
264. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 historical and statutory notes (West 2004).
265. Marriage Cases Respondent’s Brief, supra note 85, at 1 (“The Legislature has
found that, despite longstanding discrimination, many gay men and lesbians ‘have formed
lasting, committed, and caring relationships’ with another person . . . .”).
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counsel Ted Olson interrogated Sandy Stier, would-be bride of the
eponymous Kris Perry, as to the validity of her “gay” identity.266 Stier,
again, had been married to a man.267
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Ms. Stier,
....
. . . you live with Ms. Perry?
I do.
And tell us about your family?
Well, our family is a blended family with our four boys. We each bring
two biological children to our family. . . .
....
How would you describe your sexual orientation?
I’m gay.
When did you learn that about yourself?
I really learned it about myself fairly late in life, in my mid-thirties.
Had you been married before at that time?
Yes, I was married before.
....
And you had no feeling at that point in time married to a man that you
were a lesbian?
At that time I did not.
....
And how did your relationship with [Ms. Perry] develop?
....
I was teaching a computer class and she was a student in my class. . . .
[T]hen we started working together on projects at work . . . and became
fast friends quite quickly. . . . I began to realize that . . . I had a very
strong attraction to her and, indeed, I was falling in love with her. . . .
I had never experienced falling in love before, and I think—
Are you saying that you weren’t in love with your husband?
I was not in love with my husband, no. . . .
....
And while I did love him when I married him, I honestly just couldn’t
relate when people said they were in love.
....
How convinced are you that you are gay? You’ve lived with a husband.
You said you loved him. Some people might say, Well, it’s this and then
it’s that and it could be this again. Answer that.
Well, I’m convinced, because at 47 years old I have fallen in love one
time and it’s with Kris. . . .
Why are you a plaintiff in this case?
Well, I’m a plaintiff in this case because I would like to get married, and
I would like to marry the person that I choose and that is Kris Perry. She
is a woman. And according to California law right now, we can’t get
married, and I want to get married.268

Olson is a renowned advocate, a former Solicitor General. Why would
he embark on this sensitive and—as we shall see—potentially dangerous
line of questioning unless he thought it important to negate the possibility
266.
267.
268.
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See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text.
See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 181, at 160–67.
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that one of his clients is bisexual—perhaps, indeed, both of his lead
clients, each of whom “bring[s] two biological children” to their family?269
Commenting on this interrogation, Professor Elizabeth Glazer observes
that “[t]he assumption in same-sex marriage lawsuits seems to be that
plaintiffs should identify not only as members of same-sex couples but
also as homosexual individuals.”270 Bisexual activists get the same
impression. “I’m sure that if I identified as lesbian,” says Robyn Ochs,
“it would [be] easier to make me a poster-child.”271
Why aren’t bisexuals desirable plaintiffs? What imperatives compel
Ted Olson to clarify that his client is not one? Kenji Yoshino’s The
Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure offers a theoretical framework
for approaching these questions.272 Arguing that bisexual erasure is not
just a quirky habit of thought attributable to mere ignorance or
indifference, Yoshino proposed that homosexuals and heterosexuals both
have interests in perpetuating a fantasy that bisexuality does not exist,
among them “defending norms of monogamy” and “stabilizing sexual
orientation.”273 The following subparts treat each of these investments
in turn.
B. An Argument from Bisexuality for Polygamous Marriage?
When the subject of bisexuality is raised in legal debate on same-sex
marriage, it usually embellishes the claim that if two men or two women
may marry, legalized polygamy cannot be far behind.274 Interveners in
Washington State’s marriage case, for example, argued that “[t]he State
need no more ‘prove’ that excluding gays furthers the purposes of
heterosexual marriage than excluding bisexuals who wish to marry a
man and woman.”275 More rarely, invocations of bisexuality evince fear

269. Id. at 161.
270. Elizabeth M. Glazer, Sexual Reorientation 30 (Hofstra Univ. Sch. of Law
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 10-30, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1690590 (published in revised form as Elizabeth M. Glazer,
Sexual Reorientation, 100 GEO. L.J. 997 (2012)).
271. See, e.g., Kendall, supra note 245, at 191.
272. See Yoshino, supra note 14.
273. Id. at 362.
274. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Center for Law & Justice in
Support of Respondent Proposition 22 Legal Defense & Education Fund at 16–17, In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (No. S147999).
275. Intervenor’s Reply Brief at 2, Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963 (Wash.
2006) (No. 75934-1).

457

of another deviation from monogamy: adultery. One of plaintiffs’ expert
witnesses in Varnum was asked whether he knew of any “particular
difficulties encountered by bisexuals compared to gays or heterosexuals
in sustaining their relationships,”276 while another expert was interrogated
on the possibility that HIV could be “spread through bisexuals having
sex with both men and women.”277
There are both ideological and empirical reasons for bisexuality’s
thorny relation to the norm of monogamy. As Professor Yoshino might
observe, it is primarily a consequence of the cultural valuation of sex—
male/female—as “a dominant metric of differentiation.”278 Bisexuality
would scarcely disturb norms of monogamy if the difference between
men and women were not so erotically portentous that a person who
desires both sexes and is limited to one partner endures harsher
deprivation and greater temptation than a person who desires only his or
her partner’s sex. The theory is to some extent borne out by experience.
Although most self-identified bisexuals prefer monogamous
relationships,279 they are more likely than most people to favor less
restrictive arrangements (or at least to be honest about it),280 and their
political and autobiographical writings attest to widespread ambivalence
and antagonism toward this powerful cultural ideal.281
To the extent bisexuals provoke concerns about monogamy or raise
such concerns themselves, their participation or acknowledgment in
same-sex marriage litigation might undermine the wholesome image of
“committed couples” that plaintiffs are carefully selected to project.282
To date, however, bisexuality’s uneasy relationship to monogamy—like
gay men’s equally fraught association with promiscuity—has lacked
serious legal currency.283 The specter of polygamy is raised more often
276. Deposition of George Austin Chauncey, Jr. at 58, Varnum v. Brien, No.
CV5965 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Aug. 30, 2007), 2007 WL 2809785.
277. Deposition of Gregory M. Herek, Ph.D. at 74, Varnum, No. CV5965, 2007 WL
2809784.
278. Yoshino, supra note 14, at 362.
279. See Paula C. Rust, Monogamy and Polyamory: Relationship Issues for
Bisexuals, in BISEXUALITY: PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS, supra note 159, at 127, 135.
280. Paula C. Rodríguez Rust, The Biology, Psychology, Sociology, and Sexuality of
Bisexuality, in BISEXUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 170, at 403, 421–22
(collecting studies).
281. See, e.g., PLURAL LOVES: DESIGNS FOR BI AND POLY LIVING (Serena AnderliniD’Onofrio ed., 2004); BI ANY OTHER NAME, supra note 166.
282. Brief of Civil Rights Groups Anti-Defamation League et al. at 1, 3, Hernandez
v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) (No. 10343/04).
283. See Brief of Amici Curiae Focus on the Family et al. in Opposition to
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 28, Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 14
Mass L. Rptr. 591 (Super. Ct. 2002) (No. 01-1647A), 2001 WL 34825140 [hereinafter
Goodridge Focus on the Family Brief] (discussing “ample evidence that homosexual
relationships are highly promiscuous”); Brief of Monmouth Plastics, Corp. & John M.
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without reference to bisexuality than with it, and no judge has discussed,
let alone endorsed, the bisexual spin on this most common of slipperyslope arguments. Still, gay rights advocates might fear that an argument
from bisexuality for same-sex marriage paves the way to an argument
from bisexuality for polygamy. If the marital rule of heterosexuality
compels bisexuals to choose one sex over the other, the rule of monogamy
compels them to choose one sex or another.
Today, polygamy seems distinguishable from same-sex marriage on a
number of grounds. Polygamy bans are said to thwart, in Lawrence’s
words, “abuse of an institution”284: if one can marry two, then why not
four, eight, sixteen?285 Others say these bans prevent “injury,”286 mainly
to women and girls,287 by inhibiting “patriarchal . . . despotism” in the
private sphere and safeguarding the family’s public function as an incubator
of democratic values.288 Repealing these bans, moreover, would entail
far more fundamental changes to the legal order than permitting samesex marriage. As Professor Adrienne Davis has argued, plural marriages
accommodate “serial additions and exits” that disrupt family law’s
relatively manageable “binary between intact and dissolving families.”289
Whether or not such distinctions will continue to persuade,290 there is
a more compelling and relevant reason why an argument from
bisexuality for same-sex marriage does not entail an argument from
bisexuality for polygamy. Quite simply, the analogy fails the test of
Bonforte Sr. as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Respondents at 43, Lewis v.
Harris, 875 A.2d 259 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (No. A-2244-03T5) (discussing
“documented promiscuity among homosexual males”); cf. Andersen v. King Cnty., 138
P.3d 963, 1036 (Wash. 2006) (Bridge, J., dissenting) (citing legislator’s characterization
of “homosexual people as inherently more promiscuous” as evidence of antigay animus).
284. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
285. Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining
for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2025 (2010) (counting “corruption and fraud”
among the “charge[s] against polygamy”).
286. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
287. See Maura Strassberg, The Crime of Polygamy, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 353, 357 (2003).
288. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165–66 (1878).
289. See Davis, supra note 285, at 1994–95.
290. A number of prominent voices already are not persuaded. See, e.g., State v.
Holm, 2006 UT 31, ¶ 131, 137 P.3d 726, 758 (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (concluding that bigamy prosecution based on a marriage “unlicensed,
unsolemnized by any civil authority” violates “the privacy of intimate, personal
relationships between consenting adults”); Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 667, 688 (2010) (“The legal arguments against polygamy . . . are extremely
weak.”).
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logic. Bisexuality implies choice along the very axis—male/female—
that same-sex marriage bans explicitly maintain. It does not necessarily
entail a unique capacity or preference for nonmonogamy, as same-sex
marriage advocates already argue when the issue arises.291 The bisexual’s
choice of one person, of but one sex, simply sets in stark relief “what is
emotionally”—and sexually—“the case for any . . . marriage.”292 As
sociologists Philip Blumstein and Pepper Schwartz found in studies
involving more than 12,000 participants, “[n]on-monogamy touches the
lives of all couples[, e]ven if they are in fact monogamous.”293
Temptation is one law that does not discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation.
C. Bisexuality and the Rhetoric of Gay Equality
Same-sex marriage advocates have more pressing reasons than
polygamy to avoid the subject of bisexuality. These reasons cluster
around the first of the imperatives discussed in Yoshino’s article:
stabilizing a categorical, binary conception of sexual orientation.294 This
imperative is articulated most blatantly in the argument that same-sex
marriage bans do not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation
because there is no such thing as sexual orientation—that the “construct
lacks conceptual clarity and precision of definition.”295 The wide
spectrum of bisexuality and the multiple variables by which it can be
defined provide fodder for this claim, ironically a longtime favorite of
queer scholarship.296 Although ignored by judges and same-sex marriage

291. Telephone Interview with Jon Davidson, Legal Dir., Lambda Legal (Aug. 4,
2011).
292. GARBER, supra note 234, at 419.
293. PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES 267–306 (1983).
294. Yoshino, supra note 14, at 362.
295. Declaration of Warren Throckmorton, PhD as Expert Witness for Defendant at
para. 5, Varnum v. Brien, No. CV5965 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Aug. 30, 2007), 2007 WL
2809840; see also Brief Amici Curiae of Professors of Psychology & Psychiatry in
Support of Defendants-Respondents at 13–14, Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006)
(No. A-224-03T5) [hereinafter Lewis Psychologists’ Brief] (calling strict scrutiny
“inappropriate . . . when no scientific or social consensus exists on the nature, membership
and characteristics of the class claiming discrimination”).
296. See Brief of Amici Curiae Ass’n of Md. Families & Liberty Counsel in
Support of Appellants at 17, Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007) (No. 44)
[hereinafter Maryland Families Brief] (“[T]he categories of homosexual and heterosexual ‘are
rhetorical . . . because of a disjuncture between the concepts of homosexual and
heterosexual and the sexual acts they claim to signify.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Mezey, supra note 229, at 98)); see also Lewis Psychologists’ Brief, supra note 295, at 4.
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advocates alike, the claim epitomizes the deconstructive potential that
renders bisexuality problematic for several prominent advocacy scripts.297
As the legal director of a major gay rights organization confirmed, the
main “challenge” bisexuality poses in same-sex marriage litigation is
convincing courts that same-sex marriage bans discriminate on the basis
of sexual orientation and persuading them to apply heightened scrutiny.298
Bisexuality troubles three arguments by which advocates accomplish
these tasks. First, it complicates the equation of homosexual conduct
and homosexual status that permits judges to analyze same-sex marriage
bans under equal protection principles, even though these laws regulate
relationships and make no mention of sexual orientation. This is the
“O’Connor argument for same-sex marriage,” named in honor of that
Justice’s concurring opinion in Lawrence.299 Second, bisexuality disturbs
the claim that same-sex marriage bans discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation by denying homosexuals “meaningful exercise” of the
right to marry. This is the “Blackmun argument for same-sex marriage,”
named in honor of that Justice’s dissenting opinion in Bowers.300 Finally,
and still within the ambit of equal protection, bisexuality muddles the
“immutability excuse,” or the argument that same-sex marriage bans
warrant heightened scrutiny because sexual orientation is inalterable.
Each of these arguments, as presently articulated, is legally and
strategically unsound, and should not stand in the way of an argument
from bisexuality for same-sex marriage.
1. The Conduct-Status Conflation
In the litigation that temporarily brought same-sex marriage to
California, Governor Schwarzenegger and several amici raised the
common argument that the state’s marriage laws “do not classify on the
basis of sexual orientation” because they “make no mention of sexual
orientation, nor . . . make heterosexuality a prerequisite for a marriage

297. For approving accounts of “bisexuality as a tool of deconstructive analysis,”
see STEVEN ANGELIDES, A HISTORY OF BISEXUALITY 131, 132–61 (2001); GARBER, supra
note 234, at 15, 30, 65–66, 526.
298. Telephone Interview with Jon Davidson, supra note 291 (“The challenge is
getting the court to recognize that it is sexual orientation discrimination . . . and getting
the court to apply heightened scrutiny.”).
299. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579–85 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
300. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199–214 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
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license.”301 Though only a handful of judges have credited this argument,302
and though a surprising number of decisions ruling against same-sex
marriage have explicitly rejected it,303 same-sex marriage advocates
sometimes feel obliged to refute it head-on. Presupposing some form of
status-based discrimination, plaintiffs in California called the state’s
position incompatible with its assertion that the marriage laws, which
apply equally to men and women, do not “classify on the basis of gender”:
“If not sexual orientation, then what?”304 More often, advocates establish
sexual orientation discrimination by invoking Justice O’Connor’s theory
in Lawrence that the nature of the proscribed relationship―homosexual
—defines the class of persons burdened by the law—homosexuals.305
As Judge Vaughn Walker wrote in Perry, echoing four major LGBT
advocacy organizations, “[t]hose who would choose to marry someone of
the same sex—homosexuals—have had their right to marry eliminated.”306
The conflation of homosexual conduct and status did not originate
with Justice O’Connor. It has a long history, legal and otherwise; it is in
some sense the history of homosexuality itself.307 In the same-sex
marriage context, it has been a feature of legal debate since the landmark
Hawaii case of Baehr v. Miike, where the state rebutted plaintiffs’ claim
of sex-based discrimination by asserting that its prohibition of same-sex
301. Answer Brief of Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger & State Registrar of Vital
Statistics Teresita Trinidad on the Merits at 25, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal.
2008) (No. S147999) [hereinafter Schwarzenegger Brief]; see also Brief of Amicus
Curiae, the Family Research Council, in Support of the Intervening DefendantsAppellants at 16–19, Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-16696);
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Knights of Columbus in Support of the State Defendants at
14–15, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (No. S147999); Brief of DefendantAppellees with Appendix at 43, Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407
(Conn. 2008) (No. S.C. 17716); Goodridge Focus on the Family Brief, supra note 283, at
15–16; Reply Brief of Appellant King County at 10–11, Andersen v. King Cnty., 138
P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (No. 75934-1).
302. See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 362–63 (D.C. 1995)
(Steadman, J., concurring); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 975
(Mass. 2003) (Spina, J., dissenting); Lewis v. Harris, No. MER-L-15-03, 2003 WL
23191114, at *22 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 5, 2003).
303. See In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 709–10 (Ct. App. 2006)
(depublished); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 606 (Md. 2007); Hernandez v. Robles,
855 N.E.2d 1, 11 (N.Y. 2006); Hernandez v. Robles, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354, 360–61 (App.
Div. 2005), aff’d, 855 N.E.2d 1.
304. Marriage Cases Respondent’s Brief, supra note 85, at 40 (emphasis omitted).
305. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583–84 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
306. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 996 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub
nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Perry LGBT Advocates’
Brief, supra note 87, at 4 (“Proposition 8 stripped from lesbians and gay men their right
to . . . marriage, while leaving intact a lesser status through which same-sex couples may
access all the [institution’s] legal rights and obligations.” (emphasis added)).
307. See generally DAVID M. HALPERIN, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HOMOSEXUALITY
AND OTHER ESSAYS ON GREEK LOVE (1990) (providing a history of homosexuality).
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marriage “disadvantages only those individuals who desire to marry
persons of the same sex—that is, a class of homosexuals.”308 Under Bowers,
then, the conduct-status equation could be fatal to gay rights claims;309
under Lawrence, and particularly Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, it is a
gateway to equal protection.310 Popular with judges on both sides of the
same-sex marriage debate, Justice O’Connor’s unapologetic conflation
has been adopted in rulings from California,311 Connecticut,312 Iowa,313
and Maryland.314
As presently articulated, the conduct-status equation excludes bisexuals,
and is to that extent an inaccurate description of the class disadvantaged
by same-sex marriage laws. Although Justice O’Connor admits in
Lawrence that homosexual conduct is at best “closely correlated” with
homosexual identity,315 maintaining the closeness of this correlation
gives advocates a powerful incentive to downplay bisexuals’ membership
in their constituency. This is not to say that the equation should be retired.
In addition to its unwitting reproduction of the discursive conditions
under which same-sex couples actually live,316 it is perfectly coherent—
308. Defendant-Appellant’s Opening Brief at 15, Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566
(Haw. 1999) (No. 20371) [hereinafter Baehr Appellant’s Brief].
309. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641–42 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“If it is constitutionally permissible for a State to make homosexual conduct criminal,
surely it is constitutionally permissible for a State to enact other laws merely disfavoring
homosexual conduct.”); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (“After Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination against
homosexuals is constitutionally infirm.”). For a pithy account of gay rights advocates’
need to “litigate around Hardwick,” see Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay
Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551, 1617 (1993).
310. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y v. Eck, 625 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1043 (D. Mont.
2009).
311. See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 997; In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567, 573 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 2011); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 438 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional
amendment, CALIF. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5 (West, Westlaw through Nov. 2008 amendments).
312. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431 n.24 (Conn. 2008).
313. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885 (Iowa 2009).
314. See Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 598, 605–06 (Md. 2007).
315. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003).
316. To adapt Professor Janet Halley’s account of the closet, roughly the same
phenomenon in reverse, at issue here “is not the supposed essence of sexual orientation,
but the representation of it available for social interpretation.” Because “social agents
work with social meaning[,] . . . the constitutionality of their acts must be measured in
the context of the practical, not the ideal, epistemology of their decisionmaking.” Janet
E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and
Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 934 (1989). Therefore same-sex marriage bans
may be said to discriminate against “homosexuals” insofar as same-sex coupling raises
inferences of homosexual status, even when one or both participants is actually bisexual.
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and legally accurate—to insist that a law that discriminates against
homosexuals and bisexuals is still a law that discriminates on the basis
of sexual orientation.317 What matters for equal protection purposes is
the invidiousness of the challenged legislative classification,318 not
whether the class harmed by the law is heterogeneous in its manifestation of
the trait at issue, and not whether particular members of the class are
“hybrid” with respect to that trait.319 Just as biracial people who are
partially white may claim race-based discrimination under a policy that
disadvantages nonwhites, so too may a bisexual claim orientation-based
discrimination under a same-sex marriage ban, which disadvantages anyone
who is not heterosexual.320
Admittedly, the assertion that both bisexuals and homosexuals would
not marry a same-sex partner but for their sexual orientation restates the
very assumption that same-sex marriage opponents contest when they
argue that, under the letter of the law, homosexuals are perfectly entitled
to enter different-sex marriages.321 As the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts observed, however, “intimate relations” are among “the
central expectations of marriage.”322 Even conceding that some people
pursue matrimony with little hope of satisfying consummation, courts
are entitled to take for granted that when people enter into the “sexual
family” we call marriage,323 they make this “most intimate and personal”
decision in accord with their “most intimate and personal” desires.324
An argument from bisexuality explicitly acknowledges these profound
erotic stakes of marital choice. Far from undermining same-sex couples’
See Bradford, supra note 229, at 14; Ochs, supra note 216, at 225; Rust, supra note 279,
at 128.
317. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624, 635–36 (1996) (invalidating law
discriminating against persons with “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct,
practices or relationships” (quoting COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 30b, invalidated by Romer,
517 U.S. 620)).
318. See Halley, supra note 316, at 923 (“[I]t is surely not the class, but the
classification, that is suspect.”).
319. See generally RUTH COLKER, HYBRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS, AND OTHER
MISFITS UNDER AMERICAN LAW (1996) (describing the experience of individuals living
as “legal hybrids” such as bisexuals).
320. See Mitchell v. Champs Sports, 42 F. Supp. 2d 642, 646, 649 (E.D. Tex. 1998)
(allowing “mixed-race” employee to proceed on claim of racial discrimination); Walker
v. Univ. of Colo. Bd. of Regents, Nos. 90–M–932, 90–M–372, 1994 WL 752651, at *1
(D. Colo. Mar. 30, 1994) (“Multiracial persons may be considered members of each of
the protected groups with which they have any significant identification.”), aff’d, 45 F.3d
440 (10th Cir. 1994).
321. See infra notes 332–35 and accompanying text.
322. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 n.22 (Mass. 2003).
323. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 143–98 (1995).
324. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of
Se. Penn. v. Casey, 539 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
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claim of discrimination, the bisexual’s claim of liberty foregrounds the
social practices and cultural values that give it meaning.
2. The Claim of Identity Negation
Unlike Justice O’Connor, Justice Blackmun dissented in Bowers. He
believed that, as a matter of substantive due process, Georgia’s sodomy
statute violated “individuals[‘] . . . right to choose for themselves how to
conduct their intimate relationships.”325 In a lengthy footnote, Justice
Blackmun wondered if Georgia’s law also ran afoul of the Eighth
Amendment by imposing on homosexuals the cruel and unusual punishment
of state-imposed celibacy.326 Excluding homosexual behavior from the
range of “constitutionally protected ‘decisions concerning sexual relations’”
rendered this protection “empty” for a homosexual: “[H]e or she is given
no real choice but a life without any physical intimacy.”327 This lack of
choice was vital to Justice Blackmun’s Eighth Amendment objection.
Comparing homosexuality to narcotics addiction, a “condition” that cannot
be criminalized because it “may be contracted innocently or involuntarily,”
Justice Blackmun wrote that homosexuality “is [not] simply a matter of
deliberate personal election. Homosexual orientation may well form part of
the very fiber of an individual’s personality.”328
As one conservative commentator recognized prior to Lawrence, the
logic of Blackmun’s footnote is easily applicable to same-sex marriage:
under a same-sex marriage ban, one who is exclusively and “involuntarily”
homosexual “is given no real choice but a life without” marriage.329 The
“constitutionally protected ‘decision[]’” to marry is an “empty” choice for
such a person.330 Under this view, a plaintiff’s injury is not the inability
to marry the same-sex partner with whom the plaintiff brought suit, but
the inability to marry anyone who is sexually compatible. As plaintiffs
in New Jersey argued, homosexuals are denied “a central part of the

325. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 214 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting),
overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
326. Id. at 202 n.2.
327. Id. (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 711 (1977)).
328. Id. (quoting Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962)).
329. Gerard V. Bradley, Same-Sex Marriage: Our Final Answer?, 14 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 729, 737–38 (2000) (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 202–03 n.2
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
330. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 203 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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American dream” because, not being “drawn to different-sex partners,”
they are “defined by the State as ‘unmarriageable.’”331
A number of opinions recognizing a right to same-sex marriage have
picked up the theme of “unmarriageable” homosexuals, more or less
directly in response to the argument—called “sophistic” by one court—
that same-sex marriage bans do not discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation because the law “permit[s] a gay man or a lesbian to marry
someone of the opposite sex.”332 Citing the California Supreme Court’s
determination that “making such a choice would require the negation of
a person’s sexual orientation,”333 the Iowa Supreme Court in turn explained:
[T]he right of a gay or lesbian person . . . to enter into a civil marriage only
with a person of the opposite sex is no right at all. Under such a law, gay or
lesbian individuals cannot simultaneously fulfill their deeply felt need for a
committed personal relationship, as influenced by their sexual orientation, and
gain the civil status and attendant benefits granted by the statute. Instead, a
gay or lesbian person can only gain [those rights] by negating the very trait that
defines gay and lesbian people as a class—their sexual orientation.334

Or as Judge Walker succinctly put it in Perry, “[m]arrying a person of
the opposite sex is an unrealistic option for gay and lesbian individuals.”335
It is amid invocations of the Blackmun argument that the image of the
heterosexually married homosexual, a longtime object of popular
fascination and scorn,336 rears his head most noticeably in the legal
debate over same-sex marriage. One of the image’s benefits is that it
strikes powerful chords across lines of sexual politics. The thought of
“gay people . . . enter[ing] into unsuitable marriages with different-sex
partners to whom they have no innate attraction”337 is a terrifying thought to
many people, including those who have no particular sympathy for gay
rights.338 Indeed, rhetoric about the unmarriageable homosexual derives
331. Lewis Appellants’ Brief, supra note 240, at 41, 44.
332. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 441 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional
amendment, CALIF. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5 (West, Westlaw through Nov. 2008 amendments).
333. Id.
334. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885 (Iowa 2009) (citing In re Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d at 441); see also Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431
n.24 (Conn. 2008) (concluding that Connecticut’s same-sex marriage ban effectively
precludes homosexuals from marrying).
335. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub
nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).
336. See BETH BOND, MY MINISTER HUSBAND IS GAY: CHARLATAN OR SHEPHERD
(2008); JUDY HILL NELSON, CHOICES: MY JOURNEY AFTER LEAVING MY HUSBAND FOR
MARTINA AND A LESBIAN LIFE (1996); STRAIGHT WIVES: SHATTERED LIVES: STORIES OF
WOMEN WITH GAY HUSBANDS (Bonnie Kaye ed., 2006).
337. Hernandez Appellants’ Brief, supra note 260, at 69.
338. As Judge Richard Posner has noted, “it is no longer widely popular to try to
pressure homosexuals to marry persons of the opposite sex.” Irizarry v. Bd. of Ed. of
Chi., 251 F.3d 604, 607 (2001); see also Russell K. Robinson, Racing the Closet, 61
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its pathos as much from the plight of an unsuspecting heterosexual
spouse as from a homosexual’s self-“negati[on],” as Varnum imagines it,
in the closet of marriage.339 To invoke one is to evoke the other, and
thereby to figure the homosexual as both victim and villain.
Bisexuals’ heterosexual marriages, even if chosen under duress, do not
necessarily accommodate self-deception, sexual frustration, or infidelity.
Just as prohibitions of homosexual sodomy did not condemn lawabiding bisexuals to a “life without any physical intimacy,”340 same-sex
marriage bans do not condemn them to a life without conjugal marriage
or a life of unsatisfying conjugality.341 These particular harms may well
support a distinct claim that same-sex marriage bans discriminate against
exclusive homosexuals, but they do not explain why those bans discriminate
against same-sex couples as a class. A bisexual in a same-sex relationship
simply does not have recourse to the claim of identity negation.
Unlike the O’Connor argument for same-sex marriage, which presently
excludes bisexuality and need not,342 the Blackmun argument excludes
bisexuality and must do so. This exclusion points to its essential defect—
namely, a cramped and inaccurate rendering of the substantive right
whose meaningful exercise same-sex marriage bans infringe. The right
at issue in these cases is not the right to marry a member of the only sex
to which one is attracted, but the right “to join in marriage with the
person of one’s choice,” as the Supreme Court of California put it in
Perez v. Lippold, its pioneering 1948 decision on interracial marriage.343
This classic formulation carried the day in Massachusetts’s groundbreaking
decision on same-sex marriage,344 and since has been adopted by judges
in Connecticut, 345 Maryland, 346 New Jersey, 347 New York, 348
STAN. L. REV. 1463, 1482 (2009) (noting “the deep reservoir of sympathy” for women
who find themselves married to gay men).
339. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 885. For first-hand accounts of such marriages, told
from a variety of perspectives, see AMITY PIERCE BUXTON, THE OTHER SIDE OF THE
CLOSET: THE COMING-OUT CRISIS FOR STRAIGHT SPOUSES (1991); DON CLARK, LOVING
SOMEONE GAY 181–91 (5th ed. 2009); STRAIGHT WIVES: SHATTERED LIVES, supra note
336; CARREN STROCK, MARRIED WOMEN WHO LOVE WOMEN (2d ed. 2008).
340. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 203 n.2 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
341. See Adam J. MacLeod, The Search for Moral Neutrality in Same-Sex
Marriage Decisions, 23 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 22–23 (2008).
342. See supra Part IV.C.1.
343. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 19, 21, 31 (Cal. 1948).
344. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 957–58 (Mass. 2003); id.
at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring).
345. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 461 (Conn. 2008).
346. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 635–36 (Md. 2007) (Raker, J., dissenting).
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Washington,349 and California.350 Thus the Perez formulation has been
employed both alongside and independently of the Blackmun argument,351
as has Justice O’Connor’s conduct-status conflation,352 which can
accomplish the same doctrinal purpose without reducing the right of
same-sex marriage to a right of marriage between homosexuals. The claim
of identity negation is superfluous at best and legally wrong at worst. It
does not compel bisexual erasure in same-sex marriage litigation.
3. The Immutability Excuse
In its specific concern for an individual who is inherently, irreversibly,
and exclusively homosexual, the Blackmun argument for same-sex
marriage is essentially an extension of the immutability excuse so
common to gay rights rhetoric. A plea for civil rights and social tolerance
on the ground that “we can’t help it,”353 advocates have sounded the
claim of immutability for over a century.354 In contemporary American

347. Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 278–79 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)
(Collester, J., dissenting), aff’d in part and modified in part, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
348. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 22–23 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J.,
dissenting); Hernandez v. Robles, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354, 379–80 (App. Div. 2005) (Saxe, J.,
dissenting), aff’d, 855 N.E.2d 1.
349. Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 1022–23, 1026 (Wash. 2006)
(Fairhurst, J., dissenting).
350. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 958 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d
sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012); Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48,
74 (Cal. 2009); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 420–21 (Cal. 2008), superseded by
constitutional amendment, CALIF. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5 (West, Westlaw through Nov.
2008 amendments); In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 731, 764 (Ct. App.
2006) (Kline, J., dissenting) (depublished); In re Marriage Cases, No. 4365, 2005 WL
583129, at *10 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005).
351. See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 958, 969; In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at
420–21, 440–41; Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 413, 431 n.24, 461
(Conn. 2008).
352. See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 958, 997; In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at
420–21, 438 & n.57; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 424, 461.
353. Susan R. Schmeiser, Changing the Immutable, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1495, 1520–
21 (2009).
354. See JOHN ADDINGTON SYMONDS, A PROBLEM IN MODERN ETHICS: BEING AN
INQUIRY INTO THE PHENOMENON OF SEXUAL INVERSION 131–32 app. (1896) (“Scientific
investigation has proved in recent years that a very large proportion of persons in whom
abnormal sexual inclinations are manifested possess them from their earliest childhood,
. . . and . . . are powerless to get rid of them.”); DONALD WEBSTER CORY, THE
HOMOSEXUAL IN AMERICA: A SUBJECTIVE APPROACH 184–85 (1951) (arguing that
“homosexuality is in the great majority of people affected virtually ineradicable” and it is
“futile to attempt to change the homosexual into a heterosexual”); Defense of Marriage
Act: Hearing on H.R. 3396 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 118 (1996) (statement of Andrew Sullivan, Editor, The New
Republic) (“We seek to take away no one’s right to marry; we only ask that those of us
who are gay, through no choice of our own, be allowed the same opportunity.”).
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politics, avowal of homosexuality’s immutability is overwhelmingly
correlated with support for gay rights.355
In the specifically legal domain, the question of homosexuality’s
immutability arises in a variety of contexts, from child custody suits to
political asylum claims. 356 It is invoked most prominently and
controversially in equality-based challenges to laws that discriminate
against gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals. Seizing upon scattered
suggestions by the Supreme Court that a trait’s immutability is relevant
to the constitutionality of legal distinctions based on that characteristic,
advocates for and against gay rights have debated whether sexual
orientation is “determined solely by the accident of birth”—as the Court
once said of sex—and is an aspect of selfhood that homosexuals and
heterosexuals alike are “powerless to escape or set aside”—as the Court
once said of race.357
The immutability factor in equal protection analysis may be one
reason why same-sex marriage advocates avoid the subject of bisexuality—
or, like Ted Olson in Perry, actively discount the possibility that a
plaintiff’s orientation is “this and then it’s that and it could be this
again.”358 In Perry and other cases, opponents of same-sex marriage
deploy bisexuality as a touchstone of mutability. Suddenly, the relevant
populations are described as heterosexual, homosexual, and bisexual,
and courts are briefed on cutting-edge research demonstrating
sexuality’s “fluidity.”359 It is unclear whether these deployments hit any
355. See Lydia Saad, Tolerance for Gay Rights at High-Water Mark, GALLUP (May
29, 2007), http://www.gallup.com/poll/27694/Tolerance-Gay-Rights-HighWater-Mark.
aspx.
356. See Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1091–96 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that asylum seeker’s “immutable” sexual and gender identity included him in a
“particular social group” as required for withholding of deportation); Clifford J. Rosky,
Like Father, Like Son: Homosexuality, Parenthood, and the Gender of Homophobia, 20
YALE. J.L. & FEM. 257 (2009) (examining role of gender stereotypes in cases where
parental influence on children’s sexual orientation is a consideration in custody
determinations).
357. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360 (1978); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973); see also Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity
Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of Representation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE 115, 138 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) (criticizing gay rights advocates for
incorporating the Supreme Court’s “happenstance” references to immutability into “an
indicia of suspectness checklist”).
358. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 180, at 166–67.
359. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Paul McHugh, M.D., Johns Hopkins University
Distinguished Service Professor of Psychiatry, in Support of Defendant-IntervenorsAppellants Urging Reversal at 25, Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (No.
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targets. Judges who decline to find sexual orientation immutable make
no mention of bisexuality.360
In addition to an apparent lack of judicial interest in bisexuality’s
uncomfortable associations with mutability, there are good doctrinal
reasons why those associations should not dictate the terms of same-sex
marriage advocacy. To begin with, it is simply untrue that the Supreme
Court treats immutability as a sine qua non of heightened scrutiny.
Immutability is “merely a factor” in a highly contextual, process-oriented
analysis,361 as the 1985 case of City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center
made clear.362 Concluding that the Fifth Circuit had “erred in holding
mental retardation a quasi-suspect classification,” the Cleburne Court
specifically noted retardation’s immutability in legally “relevant respects”
and it quoted with approval Professor John Hart Ely’s blunt assertion
that “there’s not much left of the immutability theory” if “classifications
based on physical disability and intelligence” are generally permissible.363
Lower courts and litigators, eager for a clear test, have continued
despite Cleburne to debate sexual orientation’s immutability as if
discrimination claims hinged on this issue.364 With time, however, the
immutability theory has developed a variation friendlier to gay rights. In
a number of cases, courts unsatisfied with the erratically enforced
immutability factor either jettisoned it entirely or redefined it to better
reflect what’s really “invidious” about legal favoritism of heterosexuality.365
Under the “new immutability,” as Professor Susan Schmeiser calls it, the
question is not whether a person can change his or her sexual
orientation, but whether it is wrong to require or prod someone to
change it, as it surely would be with race or sex or indeed religion.366

10-16696); Brief of Amicus Curiae, National Association for Research & Therapy of
Homosexuality (NARTH), in Support of the Intervening Defendants-Appellants at 3–4,
25, Perry, 671 F.3d 1052 (No. 10-16696); Maryland Families Brief, supra note 296, at
13; Lewis Psychologists’ Brief, supra note 295, at 7.
360. See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 615 n.57 (Md. 2007); Andersen v.
King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 974 (Wash. 2006).
361. Halley, supra note 316, at 927.
362. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
363. Id. at 442 & n.10 (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 150 (1980)).
364. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563,
573–74 (9th Cir. 1990) (declining to apply heightened scrutiny on the ground that
“[h]omosexuality is not an immutable characteristic”); Woodward v. United States, 871
F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (same).
365. See, e.g., Tanner v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 446 (Or. Ct. App.
1998) (holding that “immutability—in the sense of inability to alter or change—is not
necessary” for heightened scrutiny given that suspect classifications like “alienage and
religious affiliation may be changed almost at will”).
366. See Schmeiser, supra note 353, at 1496, 1519.
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The new immutability first appeared in a 1989 challenge to the military’s
ban on homosexual and bisexual servicemembers.367 “Reading the case
law in a more capacious manner,” Ninth Circuit Judge William Norris
construed “immutable” to describe characteristics “so central to a
person’s identity that it would be abhorrent for government to penalize a
person for refusing to change them, regardless of how easy that change
might be.”368 Over the next decade, gay rights advocates successfully
urged district courts in Kansas and New York to adopt Judge Norris’s
approach,369 and more recently his definition prevailed, as a matter of
state constitutional law, in the highest courts of California, Connecticut,
and Iowa—all in rulings on same-sex marriage.370
The new immutability turns the old immutability on its head,
displacing the constitutional inquiry from the realm of empirical fact to
that of normative judgment and, in the end, personal conscience. In the
spirit of what Professor Yoshino has dubbed the “new equal protection,”
the new immutability blurs the “distinction between . . . equality claims . . .
and . . . liberty claims.”371 Lawrence, as noted earlier, is in some respects
exemplary of this fusion, and provides independent validation of the new
immutability in the specific context of gay rights.372 As the term’s
originator recognized, the new immutability, like the Supreme Court’s
holding in Lawrence, is ultimately about individual “self-determination”
in the domain of sexuality.373 Again: “These matters, involving the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
367. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1989).
368. Id. at 726 (Norris, J., concurring). Judge Norris’s definition language tracks
the one adopted by the Board of Immigration Appeals for use in asylum cases in Matter
of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233–34 (B.I.A. 1985).
369. See Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1548 (D. Kan. 1991), rev’d, 976 F.2d
623 (10th Cir. 1992); Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 863–64 (E.D.N.Y. 1997),
rev’d on other grounds, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998).
370. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442–43 (Cal. 2008), superseded by
constitutional amendment, CALIF. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5 (West, Westlaw through Nov.
2008 amendments); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 438 (Conn.
2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 893 (Iowa 2009).
371. Yoshino, supra note 44, at 749–50, 762 n.104 (counting immutability among
several issues the Court bypasses when, resorting to “rational basis with bite[,] . . . it
effectively admits that there is no principled test” for determining which classifications
warrant heightened scrutiny).
372. See supra notes 40–51 and accompanying text.
373. Schmeiser, supra note 353, at 1519; see also Francisco Valdes, Anomalies,
Warts and All: Four Score of Liberty, Privacy and Equality, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1341, 1398
(2004) (concluding that “Lawrence, as the progeny of Griswold and Carey” protects
“self-determination specifically in sexual relations”).
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central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”374 This existential language,
when taken seriously, dispels any doubt as to mutability’s inconsequence
to constitutional debate on gay rights.375
Still, the U.S. Supreme Court’s pronouncements in Cleburne and
Lawrence are not binding on judges interpreting state constitutions, who
often ignore the federal origins of the heightened scrutiny analysis they
claim as their own.376 If satisfaction of the immutability factor is required in
such cases, gay rights litigators will prefer to cover their bases. The
efficacy of this lawyerly fastidiousness is debatable, however, as a
justification for bisexuals’ low profile in same-sex marriage litigation.
Rather than simply failing to persuade, arguments from immutability
wrongly assume that certain judges are persuadable. The courts that
withhold heightened scrutiny on the dubious ground of sexual
orientation’s mutability are the same that withhold it anyway on the still
less defensible theory that homosexuals and bisexuals, unlike women
and racial minorities, are insufficiently “powerless” to merit special
judicial solicitude.377
Finally—and no doubt for some readers most importantly—there is no
necessary reason why bisexuality itself cannot be an immutable sexual
orientation. As one woman puts it, “I call myself bisexual because that’s
what I am. I never had a choice, no more than heterosexuals or
homosexuals have a choice; we’re born that way.”378 Though the
possibility may be greeted, as in Perry, with something like surprise,
there is sufficient empirical evidence to support the finding that “the vast
majority of lesbians and gay men, and most bisexuals as well, when
asked how much choice they have about their sexual orientation say that
they have ‘no choice’ or ‘very little choice’ about it.”379
374. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (emphasis added) (quoting
Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
375. See Schmeiser, supra note 353, at 1505 (arguing that, since Lawrence, “there is
no longer any jurisprudential reason to embrace a model of homosexuality as compulsive
and ineluctable”).
376. See, e.g., Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 973 (Wash. 2006) (citing
Hanson v. Hutt, 517 P.2d 599, 602–03 (Wash. 1973) (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 688) (1973))).
377. See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 611 (Md. 2007) (withholding
heightened scrutiny on both grounds); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 974–76 (same); see also
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Is Political Powerlessness a Requirement for Heightened
Equal Protection Scrutiny?, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 30 (2010) (arguing that the supposed
political powerlessness factor is “a woeful misreading of American legal and cultural
history, U.S. Supreme Court precedent, and political theory”).
378. C.S. Gilbert, in GETTING BI, supra note 178, at 118; see also KLEIN &
SCHWARTZ, supra note 157, at 127–28.
379. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 966 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub
nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).
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V. BISEXUALITY AND THE POLITICS OF CONTAINMENT
In the age of the new immutability, what remains of the old
immutability’s allure? Certainly much of its attraction will continue to
operate at a deeply personal level. Because most people do not feel they
have chosen their sexual orientation,380 the immutability excuse carries
an autobiographical resonance that facilitates both self-acceptance and
acceptance from others.381 Politically, the immutability excuse would do
more than extend these private acts of forgiveness into public absolution
and tolerance. It also buttresses a promise, usually but not always
implicit, that homosexuality and in turn gay rights are essentially
minority concerns.382 If homosexuality is indeed fixed, unchangeable,
ineradicable, then liberalization will not increase its incidence beyond a
small but significant segment of the population.
As Judge Richard Posner observes, assurance that homosexuals
constitute a fraction, not a faction, is important to many heterosexuals:
“[I]f the concern about same-sex marriage is that by placing its
imprimatur on homosexuality the state would encourage some teenagers
to adopt a homosexual orientation (something parents worry about),
there is little point in immiserating homosexuals in order to maintain a
posture of official disapproval of homosexual activity.”383 Judge James
Burns in Hawaii expressed similarly cautious support. Sympathetic to
380. Id.; see also EDWARD STEIN, THE MISMEASURE OF DESIRE: THE SCIENCE,
THEORY, AND ETHICS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION 261 (1999) (“[M]ost people do not feel
like they chose their sexual orientation [and] most people’s sexual orientations do not
seem changeable.”).
381. See Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique
of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 567 (1994).
382. See Brief for Appellees at 65, Perry, 671 F.3d 1052 (No. 10-16696) (noting,
amid discussion of homosexuality’s immutability, that “the Proposition 8 campaign itself
. . . assumed voters understood the existence of homosexuals as individuals distinct from
heterosexuals”); CORY, supra note 354, at 4–5 (justifying homosexuality as a “minority
problem” by reference to “the involuntary and inescapable nature of [minority] group
belonging”); SYMONDS, supra note 354, at 131–33 (arguing that homosexuality is
immutable, that homosexuals comprise “a small minority,” and that the spread of
“unnatural vices” is not a “formidable” danger of decriminalization).
383. Richard A. Posner, Should There Be Homosexual Marriage? And If So, Who
Should Decide?, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1578, 1584 (1997) (reviewing ESKRIDGE, THE CASE
FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 19); see also Dean v. District of Columbia, 653
A.2d 307, 353 (D.C. 1995) (Ferrren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(crediting “the possibility that public policies which can be seen as positively endorsing
homosexuality, in contrast with policies . . . limited simply to forbidding discrimination
against homosexuals, may have some bearing on how free an impressionable youth may
feel to engage in homosexual experiences”).
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the state’s argument that “allowing same[-]sex couples to marry
conveys in socially, psychologically, and otherwise important ways
approval of non-heterosexual orientations and behaviors,”384 he sought
further fact-finding on whether sexual orientation is “biologically fated.”385
If not, the Hawaii constitution would “permit the State to encourage
heterosexuality and discourage homosexuality, bisexuality, and asexuality
by permitting [only] opposite-sex” couples to marry.386
To the extent legalization of same-sex marriage will embolden some
people “to adopt a homosexual orientation,”387 Judge Posner and Judge
Burns share with Justice Scalia a reason to reject it: containment.388 As
the new immutability suggests, however, and as the Supreme Court’s
decision in Lawrence affirms, containing “the spread of homosexuality”389
is no longer a viable governmental purpose.
A. Morality, Marriage, and the Spread of Homosexuality
For many opponents of gay rights, homosexuality’s location in the
realm of moral choice justifies its prohibition and intolerance across the
board: criminalization of homosexual conduct;390 public and private
384. Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians
and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
567, 577 (1994) (quoting Defendant’s Response to Plaintiffs’ First Request for Answers
to Interrogatories at 7, Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (No. 91-1394-05)).
385. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 69–70 (Burns, J., concurring).
386. Id. at 70. Two years later, in the District of Columbia, Judge John Ferren
likewise called for fact-finding on the plausibility of the “deterrence” rationale. Dean,
653 A.2d at 355–56 (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He speculated
that the District might defend its prohibition of same-sex marriage by presenting
“scientifically credible evidence” supporting “a concern that such marriages, if deemed
legitimate, could influence the sexual orientation and behavior of children.” Id. at 355.
Judge Ferren candidly acknowledged that “[t]he state’s interest in deterring homosexual
lifestyles, of course, would be premised on the general public’s adherence to traditional
values favoring heterosexual orientation.” Id.
387. Posner, supra note 383, at 1584.
388. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The
constitutional amendment before us here . . . [seeks] to preserve traditional sexual mores
against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores through use of
the laws.”).
389. Why “Gay Marriage” Is Wrong, TFP STUDENT ACTION (June 1, 2009),
http://www.tfpstudentaction.org/politically-incorrect/homosexuality/answering-top-10arguments-used-to-push-homosexuality.html.
390. See, e.g., Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 262 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)
(noting the state’s argument that its Homosexual Practices Act promoted “the moral
values of Tennesseans” and discouraged them from “choosing a [homosexual]
lifestyle”); Tim Murphy, MAP: Has Your State Banned Sodomy?, MOTHER JONES (Apr.
19, 2011, 7:29 AM), http://motherjones.com/mojo/2011/04/map-has-your-state-bannedsodomy (reporting that Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, North Carolina, Texas, and Utah all
retained their sodomy laws after Lawrence in order to “send a message that
homosexuality is officially condemned”).
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discrimination against self-identified lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals;391
free speech infringements;392 disregard or condemnation of homosexuality
in public health education, including adolescent sex education;393 and
refusal to recognize or protect same-sex relationships.394 The moral
sentiment underlying these laws is indifferent to immutability. As Joseph
Urenek, “a concerned individual residing in the state of Massachusetts,”395
wrote as an amicus to that state’s high court in Goodridge:
Appellants argue that “immutability” is not a requirement . . . and at the same
time that homosexuality is indeed [“]beyond the individual’s control.”
Although this conclusion has not been settled it does leave us with the fact that
“nature or nurture has [foisted] upon some people a tragic burden. How to
deal with a tragic burden, however, is very different from whether Judaism,
Christianity and western civilization should drop their heterosexual marital
ideal.”396

391. See, e.g., S. Journal, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess., at 5–6 (Wash. 2006) (statement of
Sen. Robert Eugene Oke), available at http://www.leg.wa.gov/Senate/SDJ/Documents/
2006/SJ_06_019.pdf (opposing nondiscrimination bill because it “endorse[s]
homosexuality,” an “abomination” to God); Minutes of the S. Fed. & State Affairs Comm.,
2005–2006 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 4 (Kan. 2005), available at http://www.kslegislature.
org/li/m/historical/committees/minutes/05_06/senate/sfedst/Sntfedst03152005.pdf (noting
opposition to addition of sexual orientation to Kansas Act Against Discrimination on the
ground that “homosexuality is an atrocious sin, along with the acceptance of it”).
392. See, e.g., Amended Complaint at 6, Cent. Ala. Pride v. Langford, No. 2: 08-cv1533-KOB (N.D. Ala. Dec. 22, 2008) (challenging Birmingham mayor’s refusal to issue
parade permit for gay pride demonstration because he did not “condone the ‘lifestyle
choice’ represented by . . . the parade”); Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 908 F. Supp.
864, 870 (D. Kan. 1995) (invalidating school libraries’ removal of books that allegedly
“glorified a lifestyle that is sinful in the eyes of God”), aff’d in part and rev’d in part,
157 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 1998).
393. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2(c)(8) (LexisNexis 2008) (requiring sex
education in public schools to “emphasi[ze] . . . that homosexuality is not a lifestyle
acceptable to the general public”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-716(C)(1)–(3) (2009)
(prohibiting public schools from providing AIDS education that “[p]romotes a
homosexual life-style,” “[p]ortrays homosexuality as a positive alternative life-style,” or
“[s]uggests that some methods of sex are safe methods of homosexual sex”).
394. See, e.g., Brian MacQuarrie, VT House Approves Bill Allowing Same-Sex
Unions, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 26, 2000, at A1, available at 2000 WLNR 2305775
(quoting Vermont legislator’s statement that civil unions are a sign of “moral rot” and
another’s worry that they “may encourage homosexuality and lesbianism”); Manuel
Perez Rivas, Montgomery’s GOP Against Partner Benefits, WASH. POST, Oct 28, 1999,
at B2 (reporting on Montgomery County Republican Party’s resolution opposing
domestic-partner legislation that sends a “message that homosexual behavior is a valid
‘alternative lifestyle’”).
395. Brief in Support of Appellee of Amicus Curiae Joseph Ureneck at 1,
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (No. SJC-08660).
396. Id. at 5 (quotations and citations omitted).
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Bisexuality may or may not be “immutable” in the sense the law has
meant it, but it is definitely mutable in the way Urenek and millions of
“concerned” citizens care about. If Urenek’s statement leaves no doubt
that celibacy is how a homosexual should deal with his “tragic burden,”
it seems equally clear that the “marital heterosexual ideal” is society’s
aspiration for the bisexual.
The law’s moral example is particularly salient in the case of
marriage, an institution widely understood to convey not just tolerance
but affirmation. It is said that legalization of same-sex marriage “connotes
society’s full approval of homosexuality,”397 “signif[ies] social acceptance
of the moral equality of homosexuality and heterosexuality,”398
“represent[s] society’s formal endorsement of homosexual activity,”399
et cetera. Social conservatives seek to stifle these messages because—
like Sigmund Freud,400 Margaret Mead,401 Alfred Kinsey402—they perceive
a causal relationship between homophobic cultural ideals, heterosexual
social identities, and abstention from homosexual conduct.403 “As many
. . . scholars have noted, and as many parents and teachers instinctively
recognize,” said a rabbi testifying in Congress against same-sex marriage,
“the laws by which a society chooses to govern itself have (among other
things) an educational function.”404 Hence the fear that “legalization of
same-sex marriage . . . will result in more individuals living a
homosexual lifestyle.”405 Or as Professor Douglas Kmiec tersely warns,
quoting Judge Robert Bork, same-sex marriage “will lead to an increase
in the number of homosexuals.”406

397. William Safire, Op-Ed., On Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2003, at
A23 (emphasis omitted).
398. George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. & POL. 581,
581 (1999).
399. Burman Skrable, Homosexual Marriage: Much to Fear, CULTURE WARS, Oct.
1996, at 6, 7.
400. FREUD, supra note 192, at 229.
401. Mead, Bisexuality, supra note 177, at 29.
402. ALFRED C. KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 660 (1948).
403. See, e.g., ANITA BRYANT, THE ANITA BRYANT STORY 115 (1977) (quoting
psychiatrist Charles Socarides’s belief that “if homosexuality is further normalized and
raised to a level of complete social acceptability, there will be a tremendous rise in the
incidence of homosexuality”).
404. The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. 55 (1996) (prepared statement of David Zwiebel, General Counsel and
Director of Government Affairs, Agudath Israel of America).
405. Trayce Hansen, Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage Will Increase Prevalence of
Homosexuality, DR. TRAYCE HANSEN (Sept. 28, 2008), http://www.drtraycehansen.com/
Pages/writings_legalizingprt.html.
406. Douglas W. Kmiec, The Procreative Argument for Proscribing Same-Sex
Marriage, 32 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 653, 661 (2004) (quoting Robert H. Bork, The
Necessary Amendment, FIRST THINGS, Aug.–Sept. 2004, at 17, 19).
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From the perspective of thinkers like Professor Kmiec and Judge
Bork, the fight to keep marriage heterosexual is less a matter of
discrimination against an existing homosexual minority than an effort,
perhaps a last-ditch attempt, to deter us all from homosexuality.407 The
deterrence model conceives of homosexuality in terms of conduct and
lifestyle, and treats it as an omnipresent threat and temptation. Its
premise, sometimes explicit, is bisexuality’s universality or unpredictably
high prevalence in the population, especially among youth.408 William J.
Bennett, relying on academic findings that “a very substantial number of
people are born with the potential to live either straight or gay lives,”
cautions against the “signals [same-sex marriage] would send, and the
impact of such signals on the shaping of human sexuality, particularly
among the young.”409 Professor George Dent asserts that “[a] few
people are immutably homosexual in that they cannot enjoy heterosexual
relations, but many people can enjoy both. . . . In societies intolerant of
homosexuality more men with homosexual inclinations will enter
traditional marriages.”410
So long as sodomy prohibitions were the major legal markers of
homosexuality’s social condemnation, a presumption of universal
bisexuality—sometimes reflective of a fundamental human propensity to
sin—informed the need for those measures.411 More recently, bisexuality
has provided sodomy laws a justification that was at least partially
responsive to Justice Blackmun’s concern about their lamentable effects
on homosexuals: the few should be sacrificed for the many. Professor
Mary Anne Case, for example, recalls a colleague who rejoiced at the
Supreme Court’s decision in Bowers “because,” in his words, “we are all

407. Professor Eskridge describes this model as “no promo homo” and neatly
schematizes its logic, but he rejects the possibility that “gay marriage” and other “progay
policies” increase the incidence of “homosexual sodomy.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., No
Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse and the Channeling Effect of
Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1365–72 (2000).
408. Joe Sartelle, Rejecting the Gay Brain (and Choosing Homosexuality), BAD
SUBJECTS (May 1994), http://bad.eserver.org/issues/1994/14/ (“It is as though, in the
anti-gay right-wing imagination, people are fundamentally bisexual.”).
409. William J. Bennett, Op-Ed., . . . But Not a Very Good Idea, Either, WASH.
POST, May 21, 1996, at A19.
410. Dent, supra note 398, at 612–13.
411. See Erwin J. Haeberle, Bisexuality: History and Dimensions of a Modern
Scientific Problem, in BISEXUALITIES, supra note 193, at 13, 13.
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inherently bisexual and it saves us from ourselves.”412 In a similar vein,
John Ellington and Professor Arthur Murray, responding in a spirit of
“compromise” to widespread academic criticism of Bowers, offered a
model sodomy statute that would condemn “same-gender sodomy,
except between true homosexuals.”413 Under the proposed law, “[t]he
bisexual is directed to make a choice.”414 Invoking Bowers’s affirmation
of the legislative prerogative to “define and proscribe deviant behavior
in [the] pursuit of secular morality,” Murray and Ellington concluded
that “[a] state may frustrate a bisexual’s desire for homosexual intercourse
just as it may frustrate any adult’s libidinal hankering for a fifteen year
old Lolita, a close adult relative, a prostitute or a willing animal.”415
Notably, Murray and Ellington took a firm stand against legalization of
same-sex marriage; on this issue, the immutability question was
irrelevant.416
B. Unconstitutional Containment
In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court endorsed as a rational
basis for Georgia’s sodomy law the “belief of a majority of the electorate
. . . that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable.”417 “The
law,” it said, “is constantly based on notions of morality,” and it
declined to find an exception for “majority sentiments about the morality
of homosexuality.”418 Though Bowers was, in fact, the Court’s sole opinion
in the latter half of the twentieth century to “rel[y] exclusively on an
explicit morals-based justification,”419 the decision’s anomalousness
only underscored the Justices’ special solicitude toward disapproval of
homosexuality. Such indulgence, however, did not characterize the state
supreme courts, including Georgia’s, that continued even after Bowers to
strike down sodomy laws on the ground that morality alone could not
support them.420
412. Mary Anne Case, A Lot to Ask, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 89, 94 (2010)
(reviewing MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2010)).
413. Arthur A. Murphy & John P. Ellington, Homosexuality and the Law: Tolerance
and Containment II, 97 DICK. L. REV. 693, 697, 701, 709–10 (1993).
414. Id. at 698.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 706.
417. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
418. Id.
419. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and
After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1236 (2004).
420. See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332, 353–54 (Ark. 2002); Powell v.
State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 24–25 (Ga. 1998); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487,
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Morality, being the only state interest endorsed by the Court in
Bowers, was in turn the only interest that Texas offered the Court in
Lawrence: “The prohibition of homosexual conduct . . . represents the
reasoned judgment of the Texas Legislature that such conduct is
immoral and should be deterred.”421 But noting its “obligation to define
the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code,”422 the Court held
that “the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for
upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”423 Justice O’Connor was
similarly dismissive. Having equated homosexual conduct with homosexual
status, she went on to equate moral disapproval with the antigay
“animus” rejected in Romer v. Evans424: “Moral disapproval of this
group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is . . . insufficient to satisfy
rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.”425
Dissenting in Lawrence, Justice Scalia warned that the majority
opinion “effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation.”426 Because
nearly all laws can be justified by reference to tangible harms and
benefits, his prediction has been tested in only a handful of cases. The
results are mixed. In disputes not involving gay rights, courts are split as
to whether morality can sustain even the most forgiving standards of
judicial review.427 In cases that do involve gay rights, only the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and one court within its jurisdiction
have signaled, albeit in dicta, that deterrence of homosexuality may be a

498–502 (Ky. 1992); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 125–26 (Mont. 1997); Campbell v.
Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 264–65 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
421. Respondent’s Brief at 48, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02–102).
422. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571.
423. Id. at 577 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
424. 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
425. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
426. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
427. See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 747 (5th Cir. 2008)
(rejecting morality rationale for ban on sex toys); United States v. Extreme Assocs., Inc.,
431 F.3d 150, 161 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying obscenity jurisprudence, not Lawrence, and
affirming congressional power to prohibit interstate commerce that “promote[s] immorality”);
Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004) (accepting
public morality rationale for ban on sex toys); United States v. Stagliano, 693 F. Supp.
2d 25, 38–39 (D.D.C. 2010) (upholding conviction for obscenity distribution on the
ground that moral justifications are invalid only as to regulations of private conduct);
Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 370–71 (Va. 2005) (rejecting morality rationale for
fornication statute).
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legitimate legislative purpose.428 In the specific context of same-sex
marriage litigation, morality’s constitutional decline is clear from the
justification’s increasingly hushed and infrequent invocations. In the
Hawaii case that inaugurated the contemporary marriage movement, the
state’s primary interest was “ensuring that [the] marriage laws reflect
the moral values” of its citizens.429 Then Romer came down in 1996,
and neither Vermont in 1998 nor Massachusetts in 2002 so much as
mentioned morality in their briefs to those states’ high courts.430 Open
avowal of the marriage laws’ deterrent effect on homosexuality was a
job left to the states’ amici.431 By the time the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts ruled on the issue in 2003, Lawrence was the new law of
the land. Citing that decision, Chief Justice Marshall’s majority opinion
acknowledged the moral dimensions of the same-sex marriage controversy
only to call them constitutionally irrelevant.432 Other post-Lawrence
cases reveal a similar pattern. State parties defend same-sex marriage
bans on grounds other than morality.433 One or two amici, if any, take
up the battered flag.434 Judges who rule against same-sex marriage decline
to wave it.435 And judges who rule in favor of same-sex marriage
428. See Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 819
n.17 (11th Cir. 2004) (suggesting that morality rationale would support ban on adoption
by homosexuals); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1307, 1309 n.12 (M.D. Fla.
2005) (suggesting that a morality rationale would support the Defense of Marriage Act
and citing Lofton). But see, e.g., State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 34–35 (Kan. 2005)
(rejecting morality rationale for harsher punishment of same-sex than different-sex
statutory rape).
429. Baehr Appellant’s Brief, supra note 308, at 26–28.
430. See State’s Answer Brief, Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (No. 98032); Brief of Defendants-Appellees, Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d
941 (Mass. 2003) (No. SJC-08860).
431. See, e.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 967 (“Several amici suggest that prohibiting
marriage by same-sex couples reflects community consensus that homosexual conduct is
immoral.”).
432. Id. at 948.
433. In Indiana, for example, “the State conceded at oral argument . . . that Lawrence
effectively forecloses the possibility of relying upon moral disapproval of homosexual
relationships as the sole justification for limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples only.
The State, in fact, did not rely at all upon such disapproval in its arguments.” Morrison v.
Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 20–21 (Ind. App. 2005); see also Answer Brief of State of
California & the Attorney General to Opening Briefs on the Merits, In re Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Schwarzenegger Brief, supra note 301.
434. Although none of the state’s amici in In re Marriage Cases justified
California’s same-sex marriage ban by reference to morality, several did so in Perry.
See Amicus Brief of American Center for Law & Justice in Support of Appellants &
Urging Reversal at 6, Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-16696);
Brief of Amici Curiae, Robert George et al. in Support of Reversal & the Intervening
Defendants-Appellants at 3, Perry, 671 F.3d 1052 (No. 10-16696).
435. See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 635 (Md. 2007) (upholding samesex marriage ban on other grounds); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 1028 (Wash.
2006) (Bridge, J., dissenting).
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emphasize, invoking Lawrence, that moral disapproval of homosexuality
is out of constitutional bounds.436
All this is not to say that the politics of containment plays no role in
legal argumentation against same-sex marriage. Explicitly moralitybased justifications have given way to subtler but equally potent rhetorics of
deterrence. Two interests consistently asserted to support same-sex
marriage bans are procreation by heterosexual couples and the heterosexual
education of children.437 Judges who rule against same-sex marriage
invariably adopt some variation of the procreation rationale,438 and
several have endorsed the state’s prerogative to favor families in which
children have different-sex parents as role models.439 Same-sex marriage
advocates currently prefer to rebut these interests, especially the latter,
with empirical rather than normative arguments. They claim as matters
of fact that same-sex marriage can have no negative effect on
heterosexuals’ reproduction,440 and that same-sex parenting has no effect
on the sexuality of children.441 Their briefs note fleetingly if at all that
encouraging procreative conduct is a constitutionally dubious proposition,442
and never do they say this about the inculcation of heterosexuality in
children.443 An argument from bisexuality for same-sex marriage puts
pressure on both sides of these exchanges.

436. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 930–31 (N.D. Cal.
2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry, 671 F.3d 1052; Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp.
2d 374, 389 (D. Mass. 2010); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 32–33 (N.Y. 2006)
(Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
437. For a discussion of these arguments’ deployment in the political contest over
Proposition 8 in California, see Melissa Murray, Marriage Rights and Parental Rights:
Parents, the State, and Proposition 8, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 357, 376, 380–81 (2009).
438. See, e.g., Deane, 932 A.2d at 619, 633–35; Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7–8;
Hernandez v. Robles, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354, 359–60 (App. Div. 2005), aff’d, 855 N.E.2d 1;
Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91, 99 (Or. 2005).
439. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 217 (N.J. 2006); Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d
259, 269 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005), aff’d in part and modified in part, 908 A.2d
196; Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7–8; Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 359–60; Baker v. State,
744 A.2d 864, 884 (Vt. 1999) (calling argument “conceivable”); Andersen, 932 A.2d at
983.
440. For a particularly dogged attempt to prove this claim, see Brief of Amici
Curiae Legislators from United States Jurisdictions that Have Legalized Same-Sex
Marriage at 14–18, 25–26, Perry, 671 F.3d 1052 (No. 10-16696).
441. See Rosky, supra note 54, at 944–47.
442. See, e.g., Varnum Appellees’ Brief, supra note 243, at 36–38; Deane
Appellees’ Brief, supra note 85, at 59–60; Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Answering Brief at 30–
32, Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999) (No. 20371).
443. See Rosky, supra note 54, at 944–48.
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With regard to procreation, this Article’s argument implicitly concedes
one way in which same-sex marriage bans advance the state’s interest:
by increasing the number of bisexuals who pursue same-sex relationships,
legalization presumably will decrease these individuals’ chances of
reproducing. The risks of this tacit admission are less consequential than
might be supposed. First, judges who deny on factual grounds the
prediction that same-sex marriage will affect procreation rates also
conclude that this rationale, “[e]ven if possibly true,” fails because it is
“significantly under-inclusive.”444 As Justice Scalia noted in Lawrence,
“the sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry.”445 Second, most judges
who rule in favor of same-sex marriage reason that privileging some
offspring over others by allowing only certain parents to marry, simply
in order to encourage procreation, conflicts with the state’s more
important interests in the well-being of all children and the stability of
extant families.446 Third, because opponents of same-sex marriage must
avoid suggesting too strongly that marriage is designed to conscript
subjects into reproduction, the procreation argument has been largely
supplanted by the “paternity” argument, which recasts “procreation” to
refer to the creation of “children who are raised and loved by their own
mothers and fathers.”447 A claim from bisexuality for same-sex marriage
says nothing to affirm or refute this latter, and now dominant, rendering
of the state’s interest.
With regard to the sexual education of children, an argument that marriage
laws coerce bisexuals into heterosexual relations and relationships
obviously offers no direct support to claims about the sexually deviant
effects of same-sex parenting. Yet it suggests an analogous instance of
sexual mutability’s social manipulation: what same-sex marriage bans
are to bisexuals, different-sex parents are to children and adolescents. If
anything, this analogy seems to tilt in same-sex marriage advocates’
444. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 902 (Iowa 2009) (applying heightened
scrutiny); see also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 432 (Cal. 2008) (same),
superseded by constitutional amendment, CALIF. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5 (West, Westlaw
through Nov. 2008 amendments); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,
961 (Mass. 2003) (applying rational basis scrutiny); Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 31–32
(Kaye, C.J., dissenting) (applying rational basis scrutiny); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864,
881 (Vt. 1999) (finding “no logical connection to the stated governmental goal”).
445. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
446. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1000 (N.D. Cal.
2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012); In re Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d at 432–33; Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 32 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting);
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961–62; Baker, 744 A.2d at 881–82.
447. Brief Amici Curiae of the New Jersey Coalition to Preserve & Protect Marriage et
al. in Support of Respondents at 14, Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006); see also
Abrams & Brooks, supra note 111 (describing rise of the “accidental procreation”
argument).
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favor. Whether or not an argument from bisexuality indirectly affirms
the role-modeling rationale’s empirical plausibility, it does directly
refute the rationale’s constitutionality. The sexual development of children
is a perilously sensitive issue. Only one federal judge has explicitly
disavowed, with specific reference to children, the state’s interest in
fostering heterosexuality.448 It may be that bisexuality offers the bench a
safer ground than childhood on which to enunciate the principle that it is
not for the state to “to dictate or even attempt to influence how its
citizens should develop their sexual and gender identities.”449
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that Lawrence and other legal developments
invite a claim for same-sex marriage grounded in sexual liberty; that
bisexuality offers a compelling standpoint from which to apprehend the
claim’s veracity; and that neither doctrinal nor strategic imperatives
justify sacrificing bisexual representation on the altar of homosexual
equality, be it through the status-conduct equation, the claim of identity
negation, or the immutability excuse. These arguments would be merely
academic if the goal of same-sex marriage litigation were simply to
secure marriage licenses for the same-sex couples who want them. It
seems unlikely, if not altogether impossible, that the bisexual’s claim
would succeed where all other claims would fail.450 Yet as gay rights
advocates should be the first to know, winning a favorable ruling is not
the only impact they seek through litigation. Other important goals
include robust and fair representation of a diverse constituency, and
development of legal doctrine in directions favorable to other movement
goals.451 An argument from bisexuality clearly gives voice to one gay
rights constituency—by some estimates an “invisible majority” of LGBT

448. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275,
1300 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting).
449. Id. (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578).
450. The argument conceivably has appeal to libertarians who are skeptical of the
state’s aggressive encouragement of marriage.
451. See Douglas NeJaime, Marriage, Cruising, and Life in Between: Clarifying
Organizational Positionalities in Pursuit of Polyvocal Gay-Based Advocacy, 38 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 511 (2003); see also Douglas NeJaime Winning Through Losing, 96
IOWA L. REV. 941, 992–93 (2011) (discussing gay rights advocates’ use of sodomy
litigation to “lay[] groundwork for future . . . issues”).
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people452—whose very existence is erased in the current fight for samesex marriage. There are two additional purposes the bisexual’s libertybased claim might serve.
First, in its decisive break from the immutability excuse—its insistence
that same-sex relations and relationships are legitimate choices regardless of
whether homosexuality is a fated, fixed, or exclusive condition—the
bisexual’s claim stakes a place in gay rights advocacy for “universalizing”
as well as “minoritizing” arguments.453 It emphasizes the difference
between liberating homosexuals and liberating homosexuality,
acknowledging what is right in the conservative politics of
containment—that antigay “discrimination” rests in large part upon an
immeasurable and often inchoate homosexual potential in many
ostensible heterosexuals.454 This universalizing approach need not be
limited to same-sex marriage. It provides a conceptual basis for rethinking
a range of issues, only some of which rank, even in minoritizing form,
on the gay movement’s current agenda. Imagine, for example, a claim
in constitutional challenges to “No Promo Homo” restrictions on sex
education that a preference for heterosexually active citizens cannot
justify condemning or ignoring homosexuality and bisexuality.455 Imagine
a claim in custody cases that the variably and variously impressionable
psychosexual development of children is a basis for widening, not
limiting, the range of “lifestyle choices” to which they are exposed.456
Or imagine a claim in disputes over gender-segregated space that
heterosexist conditioning must not be legally installed into the very

452. LGBT ADVISORY COMM., S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, BISEXUAL INVISIBILITY:
IMPACTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1–3 (2011), available at http://www.birequest.org/
docstore/2011-SF_HRC-Bi_Iinvisibility_Report.pdf.
453. The universalizing-minoritizing distinction records opposing approaches to the
question, “In whose lives is homo/heterosexual definition an issue of continuing
centrality and difficulty?” Whereas minoritizing answers posit “a distinct population of
persons who ‘really are’ gay,” universalizing ones suggest that “apparently heterosexual
persons . . . are strongly marked by same-sex influences and desires.” SEDGWICK, supra
note 76, at 40, 85.
454. For a boisterous but insightful polemic on bisexuality’s challenge to the
politics of containment, see Peter Tatchell, Breaking the Barriers to Desire, in BISEXUAL
HORIZONS, supra note 232, at 240, 240–42.
455. See Lisa Duggan, Queering the State, SOC. TEXT, Summer 1994, at 1, 7–9
(urging “no promo hetero” campaigns in response to “no promo homo” laws like the
federal Helms Amendment of 1988, which withheld funding AIDS prevention programs
that “promote or encourage . . . homosexual activities”).
456. See Kim H. Pearson, Mimetic Reproduction of Sexuality in Child Custody
Decisions, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 53, 57 (2010) (urging advocates to affirm that
nonheterosexual parents “create an environment in which it is safer for children to
openly express their own sexual orientations”).
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architecture of our lives.457 These kinds of arguments, alike in their
insistence that sexuality in general and homo/hetero choice in particular
are constitutionally privileged sites of individual autonomy, warrant
elaboration as the gay rights movement considers long-term goals and
strategies for the post-Lawrence era.
Second, a claim for same-sex marriage sounding in sexual liberty
attends to widespread concern that the freedom to marry is anything but
emancipating―that it is a project unworthy of a movement that once
marched under the banner of sexual liberation. Adherents of this view
protest that marriage represents forms of assimilation and respectability
that the gay rights movement should work to destroy, not reify.458 Yet
even Michael Warner, one of the most piercing and influential of those
critics, qualifies his numerous objections by conceiving of marriage as a
means, not an end:
It is possible, at least in theory, to imagine a politics in which sex-neutral
marriage is seen as a step toward the more fundamental goals of sexual justice:
not just formal equality before the law, . . . but a substantive justice that would
target sexual domination, making possible a democratic cultivation of alternative
sexualities. . . . But the advocates of gay marriage have not made this case.459

More than a decade after Warner’s critique and nearly as long after
Lawrence, litigators for same-sex marriage still have not made this case.
Their omission obfuscates the stakes of their campaign and misses an
opportunity to advance a constitutional value whose protection is far
from complete. If “principle and logic” do sometimes shape the path of
the law,460 and in turn permeate the aspirations of social movements,461
then Lawrence’s promise of autonomy “in matters pertaining to sex”
cannot have been exhausted with the abolition of sodomy laws.462 The
457. See Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An
Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581, 594 (1976) (suggesting that rules of
urinary sex-segregation support heterosexuality).
458. See AGAINST EQUALITY: QUEER CRITIQUES OF GAY MARRIAGE (Ryan Conrad
ed., 2010).
459. Michael Warner, Normal and Normaller: Beyond Gay Marriage, 5 GLQ 119,
124 (1999) (citations omitted).
460. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
461. See Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, What Cause Lawyers Do For, and To,
Social Movements: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 1, 7,
10 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006) (describing litigation’s power to
“contribute to the construction of causes and the mobilization of movements,” as
exemplified by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
462. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
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marital institution is surely an ironic battleground on which to vindicate
this constitutional promise, but it is—for better or for worse—the signal
gay rights issue of our time. What it stands for matters.
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